By Nick Simeone
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, Feb. 27, 2014 – Two and a half years after 30
Americans were killed in what stands as the deadliest day for U.S. forces in
the Afghanistan war, a top Defense Department official told Congress today no
evasive action could have been taken that would have prevented Taliban
insurgents from being able to fire at close range on an Army transport
helicopter, an attack that killed everyone on board.
Garry Reid, the principal deputy assistant secretary of
defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, testified before the
House Oversight and Government Reform committee to provide answers to relatives
of the deceased, some of whom attended the hearing, who say they still don’t
have clear answers about events on the night of Aug. 6, 2011, in Afghanistan’s
Wardak province.
Among those killed in the attack were 17 Navy SEALs, as well
as eight Afghans who also were aboard the helicopter. One U.S. military working
dog also was killed.
The SEALS and an Army aviation battalion had spent weeks
conducting night operations hunting Taliban fighters in Wardak’s Tangi Valley.
On that night, intelligence indicated that a high-profile Taliban commander had
been spotted near the SEALs’ base camp.
With Army Rangers searching on the ground, the SEAL team,
along with Navy combat support specialists, airmen and an Army flight crew,
were aboard the Chinook when it attempted to land and surprise the retreating
enemy commander. Instead, the aircraft was fired upon by an undetected Taliban
insurgent using a rocket-propelled grenade, sending it crashing in a ball of
flame.
Reid told the House committee that a U.S. Central Command
investigation determined the Taliban were hiding in a nearby building
undetected by other U.S assets in the area, and they likely were tipped off by
the sound of the approaching Chinook.
“They were able to hear and see the Chinook as it entered
the valley, shooting at it from nearly head-on at a distance of less than 250
yards, leaving the pilot no chance to perform evasive maneuvers,” he said.
The Chinook was not equipped to carry a flight recorder, and
during today’s hearing, questions were raised about why it was also not
equipped to counter rocket-propelled grenade fire. Reid said such technology
isn’t yet available for this type of aircraft.
“Sadly, there is no technological solution that will
guarantee the safety of those thrust into battle, particularly when helicopters
are involved,” he said, adding that he still believes the Chinook was
appropriate for the mission.
“The fact remains we will always have to balance the
tactical requirement to move troops quickly across the battlefield with the
dangers of incurring lethal enemy fire and flying in extreme terrain,” he
added.
Reid told lawmakers that immediately after the loss, the
Defense Department assigned the Helicopter Survivability Task Force, which was
stood up two years before the incident, to examine potential ways to counter
rocket-propelled grenade attacks.
“Unfortunately,” he said, “the findings of this assessment
were that technologies to enable the development of active protection systems
for helicopters are immature and unproven.”
The investigation found the crew that flew the ill-fated
helicopter was experienced operating in the mountainous region, and that there
was no indication that the enemy had any advance knowledge of its flight route
and landing zone location, Reid said. In addition, the partnered Afghan forces
operating with the Americans had been trained, vetted and with them since 2009.
“We believe the SEAL task force employed sound tactics in
planning and executing their fateful mission, including the decision to load
the entire element on a single aircraft,” Reid said. He added that officials
continue to look for ways to protect U.S. forces.
“We recognize that more needs to be done to help protect our
forces, especially when they are so vulnerable in the air,” he said.