Statement for the Record
Good afternoon, Chairman
Johnson, Ranking Member Peters, and members of the committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the current
threats to the United States homeland. I am pleased to be here
representing the nearly 37,000 dedicated men and women of the FBI.
While
the COVID-19 pandemic has presented unique and unprecedented challenges
to the FBI workforce, I am proud of their dedication to our mission of
protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution. Hostile
foreign actors, violent extremists, and opportunistic criminal elements
have seized upon this environment. As a result, we are facing aggressive
and sophisticated threats on many fronts. Whether it is terrorism now
moving at the speed of social media, or the increasingly blended threat
of cyber intrusions and state-sponsored economic espionage, or malign
foreign influence and interference or active shooters and other violent
criminals threatening our communities, or the scourge of opioid
trafficking and abuse, or hate crimes, human trafficking, crimes against
children—the list of threats we are worried about is not getting any
shorter, and none of the threats on that list are getting any easier.
Counterterrorism
Preventing
terrorist attacks remains the FBI’s top priority. However, the threat
posed by terrorism—both international terrorism (IT) and domestic
violent extremism—has evolved significantly since 9/11.
The
greatest threat we face in the homeland is that posed by lone actors
radicalized online who look to attack soft targets with easily
accessible weapons. We see this lone actor threat manifested both within
domestic violent extremists (DVEs) and homegrown violent extremists
(HVEs), two distinct sets of individuals that generally self-radicalize
and mobilize to violence on their own. DVEs are individuals who commit
violent criminal acts in furtherance of ideological goals stemming from
domestic influences, such as racial bias and anti-government sentiment.
HVEs are individuals who have been radicalized primarily in the United
States, and who are inspired by, but not receiving individualized
direction from, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).
Many of
these violent extremists, both domestic and international, are motivated
and inspired by a mix of ideological, sociopolitical, and personal
grievances against their targets, which recently have more and more
included large public gatherings, houses of worship, and retail
locations. Lone actors, who by definition are not likely to conspire
with others regarding their plans, are increasingly choosing these soft,
familiar targets for their attacks, limiting law enforcement
opportunities for detection and disruption ahead of their action.
DVEs
pose a steady and evolving threat of violence and economic harm to the
United States. Trends may shift, but the underlying drivers for domestic
violent extremism—such as perceptions of government or law enforcement
overreach, sociopolitical conditions, racism, anti-Semitism,
Islamophobia, misogyny, and reactions to legislative actions—remain
constant. As stated above, the FBI is most concerned about lone offender
attacks, primarily shootings, as they have served as the dominant
lethal mode for domestic violent extremist attacks. More deaths were
caused by DVEs than international terrorists in recent years. In fact,
2019 was the deadliest year for domestic extremist violence since the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.
The top threat we face from
domestic violent extremists stems from those we identify as
racially/ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVE). RMVEs were the
primary source of ideologically motivated lethal incidents and violence
in 2018 and 2019 and have been considered the most lethal of all
domestic extremists since 2001. Of note, the last three DVE attacks,
however, were perpetrated by anti-government violent extremists.
The
spate of attacks we saw in 2019 underscore the continued threat posed
by DVEs and perpetrators of hate crimes. The FBI works proactively to
prevent acts of domestic terrorism and hate crimes. For example, in
November 2019, the Denver Joint Terrorism Task Force arrested Richard
Holzer on federal charges of attempting to obstruct religious exercise
by force using explosives. This disruption is just one example of the
strength of our Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes (DT-HC) Fusion Cell. Our
Counterterrorism Division (CTD) and Criminal Division (CID), working
together, were able to prevent a potential terrorist attack before it
occurred and, for the first time in recent history, make a proactive
arrest on a hate crimes charge. Through the DT-HC Fusion Cell,
subject-matter experts from both CTD and CID work in tandem to
innovatively use investigative tools and bring multiple perspectives to
bear in combating the intersecting threats of domestic terrorism and
hate crimes, preventing attacks and providing justice to victims.
We
recognize that the FBI must be aware not just of the domestic violent
extremism threat, but also of threats emanating from those responding
violently to First Amendment-protected activities. In the past, we have
seen some violent extremists respond to peaceful movements through
violence rather than non-violent actions and ideas. The FBI is involved
only when responses cross from ideas and constitutionally protected
protests to violence. Regardless of the specific ideology involved, the
FBI requires that all domestic terrorism investigations be predicated
based on activity intended to further a political or social goal, wholly
or in part involving force, coercion, or violence, in violation of
federal law.
HVEs and FTOs have posed a persistent threat to the
nation and to U.S. interests abroad, while their tradecraft, tactics,
and target sets have evolved. The international terrorism threat to the
U.S. has expanded from sophisticated, externally directed FTO plots to
include individual attacks carried out by HVEs who are inspired by
designated terrorist organizations. As stated above, the FBI assesses
HVEs are the greatest, most immediate international terrorism threat to
the homeland. These individuals are FTO-inspired individuals who are in
the U.S., have been radicalized primarily in the U.S., and are not
receiving individualized direction from FTOs. We, along with our law
enforcement partners, face significant challenges in identifying and
disrupting HVEs. This is due, in part, to their lack of a direct
connection with an FTO, an ability to rapidly mobilize without law
enforcement detection, and their frequent use of encrypted
communications.
Many FTOs use various digital communication
platforms to reach individuals they believe may be susceptible and
sympathetic to violent terrorist messages. However, no group has been as
successful at drawing people into its perverse ideology as ISIS, which
has proven dangerously competent at employing such tools. ISIS uses
traditional media platforms as well as widespread social media campaigns
to propagate its ideology. Terrorists in ungoverned spaces—both
physical and virtual—readily disseminate propaganda and training
materials to attract easily influenced individuals around the world to
their cause. With the broad distribution of social media, terrorists can
spot, assess, recruit, and radicalize vulnerable persons of all ages in
the U.S. either to travel to foreign lands or to conduct an attack on
the homeland. Through the internet, terrorists anywhere overseas now
have direct access to our local communities to target and recruit our
citizens and spread their message faster than was imagined just a few
years ago.
We remain concerned that groups such as the Islamic
State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda intend to carry out
large-scale attacks in the U.S. Despite their territorial defeat in Iraq
and Syria, ISIS remains relentless and ruthless in its campaign of
violence against the West and has aggressively promoted its hateful
message, attracting like-minded violent extremists. The message is not
tailored solely to those who overtly express signs of radicalization. It
is seen by many who use messaging apps and participate in social
networks. Ultimately, many of the individuals drawn to ISIS seek a sense
of belonging.
Echoing other terrorist groups, ISIS has advocated
lone offender attacks in Western countries. Recent ISIS videos and
propaganda have specifically advocated attacks against soldiers, law
enforcement, and intelligence community personnel.
As noted above,
ISIS is not the only terrorist group of concern. Al Qaeda maintains its
desire for large-scale, spectacular attacks. While continued
counterterrorism pressure has degraded the group’s Afghanistan-Pakistan
senior leadership, in the near term, al Qaeda is more likely to focus on
building its international affiliates and supporting small-scale,
readily achievable attacks in key regions such as East and West Africa.
Simultaneously, over the last year, propaganda from al Qaeda leaders
seeks to inspire individuals to conduct their own attacks in the U.S.
and the West. For example, the December 2019 attack at Naval Air Station
Pensacola demonstrates that groups such as al Qaeda continue to be
interested in encouraging attacks on U.S. soil.
The FBI regularly
reviews intelligence to ensure that we are appropriately mitigating
threats from any place by any actor, and the possible violent responses
and actions. We are sensitive to First Amendment-protected activities
during investigative and intelligence efforts so as to ensure that our
investigative actions remain aligned with our authorities and are
conducted with the appropriate protections in place for privacy and
civil liberties.
As the threat to the United States and U.S.
interests evolves, we must adapt and confront these challenges, relying
heavily on the strength of our federal, state, local, tribal, and
international partnerships. The FBI uses all lawful investigative
techniques and methods to combat these terrorist threats to the United
States. Along with our domestic and foreign partners, we are collecting
and analyzing intelligence concerning the ongoing threat posed by
violent extremists motivated by any ideology and desire to harm
Americans and U.S. interests. We continue to encourage information
sharing, which is evidenced through our partnerships with many federal,
state, local, and tribal agencies assigned to Joint Terrorism Task
Forces around the country. Be assured, the FBI continues to strive to
work and share information more efficiently, and to pursue a variety of
lawful methods to help stay ahead of these threats.
Election Security
In
less than two months, Americans will exercise one of their most
important and cherished freedoms: the right to vote in a democratic
election. Our nation is confronting multi-faceted foreign threats
seeking to both influence our national policies and public opinion and
cause harm to our national dialogue. The FBI and our interagency
partners remain concerned about, and focused on, the covert and overt
influence measures used by certain adversaries in their attempts to sway
U.S. voters’ preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies,
increase discord in the United States, and undermine the American
people’s confidence in our democratic processes.
Foreign influence
operations—which include covert, coercive, or corrupt actions by
foreign governments to influence U.S. political sentiment or public
discourse or interfere in our processes themselves—are not a new
problem. But the interconnectedness of the modern world, combined with
the anonymity of the internet, have changed the nature of the threat and
how the FBI and its partners must address it. This year’s election
cycle, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, provides ample opportunity for
hostile foreign actors to conduct disinformation campaigns and foreign
influence operations in an effort to mislead, sow discord, and,
ultimately, undermine confidence in our democratic institutions and
values and in our government’s response to our current health crisis.
Foreign
influence operations have taken many forms and used many tactics over
the years. Most widely reported these days are attempts by
adversaries—hoping to reach a wide swath of Americans covertly from
outside the United States—to use false personas and fabricated stories
on social media platforms to discredit U.S. individuals and
institutions.
The FBI is the lead federal agency responsible for
investigating foreign influence operations. In the fall of 2017, the
Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) was established to identify and
counteract malign foreign influence operations targeting the United
States. The FITF is led by the Counterintelligence Division and is
composed of agents, analysts, and professional staff from the
Counterintelligence, Cyber, Counterterrorism, and Criminal Investigative
Divisions. It is specifically charged with identifying and combating
foreign influence operations targeting democratic institutions and
values inside the United States. In all instances, the FITF strives to
protect democratic institutions and public confidence, develop a common
operating picture, raise adversaries’ costs, and reduce their overall
asymmetric advantage.
The task force brings the FBI’s national
security and traditional criminal investigative expertise under one
umbrella to prevent foreign influence in our elections. This better
enables us to frame the threat, to identify connections across programs,
to aggressively investigate as appropriate, and—importantly—to be more
agile. Coordinating closely with our partners and leveraging
relationships we have developed in the technology sector, we had a
number of instances where we were able to quickly relay threat
indicators that those companies used to take swift action, blocking
budding abuse of their platforms.
Following the 2018 midterm
elections, we reviewed the threat and the effectiveness of our
coordination and outreach. As a result of this review, we further
expanded the scope of the FITF. Previously, our efforts to combat malign
foreign influence focused solely on the threat posed by Russia.
Utilizing lessons learned over the last year and half, the FITF is
widening its aperture to confront malign foreign operations of China,
Iran, and other global adversaries. To address this expanding focus and
wider set of adversaries and influence efforts, we have also added
resources to maintain permanent “surge” capability on election and
foreign influence threats.
We have also further refined our
approach. All efforts are based on a three-pronged approach, which
includes investigations and operations, information and intelligence
sharing, and a strong partnership with the private sector. Through the
efforts of the FITF and lessons learned from both the 2016 and 2018
elections, the FBI is actively engaged in identifying, detecting, and
disrupting threats to our elections and ensuring both the integrity of
our democracy is preserved and the will of the American people is
fulfilled.
Protecting policymakers is an important part of our
efforts to combat malign foreign influence and protect our elections. As
you are aware, the FBI and our interagency partners have been providing
ongoing election security threat briefings to Congress. We will
continue to do so throughout the fall and into the future, where there
is actionable intelligence.
Lawful Access
I want to turn
now to an issue continuing to limit law enforcement’s ability to disrupt
these increasingly insular actors. We are all familiar with the
inability of law enforcement agencies to access data, even with a lawful
warrant or court order, due to “end-to-end” encryption. Increasingly,
device manufacturers and communications service providers have employed
encryption in such a manner that only the users or parties to the
communications can access the content of the communications or devices.
This is known as end-to-end encryption.
This development has meant
that, in recent years, the FBI has observed a decline in its ability to
gain access to the content of both domestic and international terrorist
communications due to the widespread adoption of encryption for
internet traffic and the prevalence of mobile messaging apps using
end-to-end encryption as default.
The FBI certainly recognizes how
encryption increases the overall safety and security of the internet
for users. But in fulfilling the FBI’s duty to the American people to
prevent acts of terrorism, this kind of end-to-end encryption creates
serious challenges. Accessing content of communications by, or data held
by, known or suspected terrorists pursuant to judicially authorized,
warranted legal process is getting more and more difficult.
The
online, encrypted nature of radicalization, along with the insular
nature of most of today’s attack plotters, leaves investigators with
fewer dots to connect. As was evident in the December 9, 2019, shooting
at Naval Air Station Pensacola that killed three U.S. sailors and
severely wounded eight other Americans, deceased terrorist Mohammed
Saeed Alshamrani was able to communicate using warrant-proof, end-to-end
encrypted apps deliberately to evade detection by law enforcement. It
took the FBI several months to access information in his phones, during
which time we did not know whether he was a lone wolf actor or whether
his associates may have been plotting additional terrorist attacks.
If
law enforcement loses the ability to detect criminal activity because
communication between subjects—data in motion—or data held by subjects—
data at rest—is encrypted in such a way making content inaccessible,
even with a lawful order, our ability to protect the American people
will be degraded. Providers and law enforcement must continue to
collaborate to explore possible technical solutions that would provide
security and privacy to those using the internet while also contributing
to the FBI’s ability to complete its mission.
Despite the
successes that result from the hard work of the men and women of the
FBI, our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and our partners across the
government, terrorism continues to pose a persistent threat to the
homeland and our interests overseas.
China Threat
The
greatest long-term threat to our nation’s information and intellectual
property and to our economic vitality is the counterintelligence and
economic espionage threat from China. It is a threat to our economic
security and by extension, to our national security.
As you have
seen from the recent closure of the Chinese Consulate in Houston, this
issue is not just an intelligence issue, or a government problem, or a
nuisance largely just for big corporations who can take care of
themselves. Our adversaries’ targets are our nation’s core economic
assets—our information and ideas, our innovation, our research and
development, our technology. No country poses a broader, more severe
threat to those assets than China. It is the people of the United States
who are the victims of what amounts to Chinese theft on a scale so
massive that it represents one of the largest transfers of wealth in
human history. If you are an American adult, it is more likely than not
that China has stolen your personal data.
In 2017, the Chinese
military conspired to hack Equifax and made off with the sensitive
personal information of 150 million Americans—we are talking nearly half
of the American population and most American adults. Our data is not
the only thing at stake here—so is our health, livelihood, and security.
The
FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case
approximately every 10 hours. Of the nearly 5,000 active FBI
counterintelligence cases currently underway across the country, almost
half are related to China. And at this very moment, China is working to
compromise American health care organizations, pharmaceutical companies,
and academic institutions conducting essential COVID-19 research. They
are going after cost and pricing information, internal strategy
documents, personally identifiable information—anything that can give
them a competitive advantage.
It is important to be clear: This is
not about the Chinese people as a whole, and certainly not about
Chinese Americans as a group, but it is about the Chinese government and
the Chinese Communist Party. Every year, the United States welcomes
more than 100,000 Chinese students and researchers into this country.
For generations, people have journeyed from China to the United States
to secure the blessings of liberty for themselves and their families—and
our society is better for their contributions. So, when the FBI’s
refers to the threat from China, we mean the government of China and the
Chinese Communist Party.
Confronting this threat effectively does
not mean that we should not do business with the Chinese. It does not
mean that we should not host Chinese visitors. It does not mean that we
should not welcome Chinese students or coexist with China on the world
stage. But it does mean that when China violates our criminal laws and
international norms, we are not going to tolerate it, much less enable
it. The FBI and our partners throughout the U.S. government will hold
China accountable and protect our nation’s innovation, ideas, and way of
life—with the help and vigilance of the American people.
Cyber
With
the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, the nature of the cyber threat has
become increasingly concerning. As more individuals telework and
increasingly use the cloud, we encounter less secure networks. As a
result, the scope of our cyber threats has changed, the impact has
deepened, and many of the players have become more dangerous as we have
become increasingly vulnerable. We are still seeing hack after hack and
breach after breach. We hear about it daily in the news. The more we
shift to the internet as the conduit and the repository for everything
we use and share and manage, the more danger we are in.
Today we
are worried about a wider-than-ever range of threat actors, from
multinational cyber syndicates to nation-state adversaries. And we are
concerned about a wider-than-ever gamut of methods continually employed
in new ways, like the targeting of managed service providers—MSPs—as a
way to access scores of victims by hacking just one provider.
China’s
Ministry of State Security (MSS) pioneered that technique and, as you
saw in July, we indicted two Chinese hackers who worked with the
Guangdong State Security Department of the MSS. These individuals
conducted a hacking campaign lasting more than 10 years, targeting
countries with high technology industries, to include the United States.
The industries targeted included, among others, solar energy,
pharmaceuticals, and defense.
Cyber crimes like these, directed by
the Chinese government’s intelligence services, threaten not only the
United States but also every other country that supports fair play,
international norms, and the rule of law, and they also seriously
undermine China’s desire to become a respected leader in world affairs.
Theft
of intellectual property is not the only cyber threat presented by the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) government. They are also working to
obtain controlled defense technology and developing the ability to use
cyber means to complement any future real-world conflict. All of them,
and others, are working to simultaneously strengthen themselves and
weaken the United States. And we are taking all these nation-state
threats very seriously.
But as dangerous as nation-states are, we
do not have the luxury of focusing on them alone. We also are battling
the increasing sophistication of criminal groups that place many hackers
on a level we used to see only among hackers working for governments.
The proliferation of malware as a service, where darkweb vendors sell
sophistication in exchange for cryptocurrency, increases the difficulty
of stopping what would once have been less-dangerous offenders. It can
give a ring of unsophisticated criminals the tools to paralyze entire
hospitals, police departments, and businesses with ransomware. Often the
hackers themselves have not become much more sophisticated—but they are
renting sophisticated capabilities, requiring us to up our game as we
work to defeat them, too.
Hackers have not relented under the
COVID-19 pandemic. On the contrary, they have attempted to compromise
the computer systems of hospitals and medical centers to obtain patient
financial data, medical records, and other information. In addition,
such attacks on medical centers may lead to the interruption of computer
networks and systems putting patients’ lives at an increased risk when
America faces its most dire health crisis in generations.
Conclusion
Chairman
Johnson, Ranking Member Peters and members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify today. I am now happy to answer any
questions you might have.
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