Preventing the Next Generation of Terrorism: Lessons History Keeps Teaching Us

Terrorism is often treated as a sudden rupture in social order—an eruption of violence that demands immediate suppression. Yet history shows that terrorism is rarely spontaneous. It is learned, inherited, and refined across generations. Each era encounters what it believes to be a novel threat, but the underlying dynamics of political violence remain strikingly consistent. Preventing the next generation of terrorism therefore requires more than improved surveillance or military capability; it requires an honest reckoning with historical patterns that societies repeatedly ignore.

One of the most persistent lessons is that terrorism is a social process before it is a security problem. Studies of extremist movements across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries demonstrate that radicalization develops through narratives of grievance, identity, and moral justification rather than through ideology alone. Individuals are rarely drawn to violence by doctrine in isolation; they are drawn by stories that explain personal or collective suffering and assign blame in morally absolute terms. Terrorist organizations survive not because they win militarily, but because they transmit these narratives effectively across time, adapting their language to new audiences while preserving core myths of victimhood and redemption. When counterterrorism strategies focus solely on eliminating leaders or dismantling cells, they often leave these narratives intact, allowing new adherents to emerge under different banners.

History also reveals the limitations of purely military solutions. Tactical victories against terrorist groups have repeatedly failed to produce lasting security when they are not accompanied by political legitimacy and social repair. In cases ranging from colonial-era insurgencies to modern counterterrorism campaigns, the use of overwhelming force has frequently reduced immediate violence while increasing long-term resentment. Civilian casualties, collective punishment, and indefinite emergency measures tend to validate extremist claims that peaceful participation is futile. This does not imply that force is unnecessary; rather, it underscores that force alone cannot resolve a phenomenon rooted in social meaning and political trust.

Modern radicalization pathways further complicate prevention efforts. Historically, extremist recruitment occurred through face-to-face relationships embedded in local communities. Today, digital platforms allow individuals to radicalize in isolation, consuming curated grievance narratives without direct organizational contact. Research indicates that online environments accelerate moral polarization by rewarding outrage, simplifying complex conflicts, and reinforcing identity-based hostility. Prevention therefore must occur earlier and more subtly than traditional security models allow. By the time an individual appears on the radar of law enforcement, the underlying process has often been underway for years.

Communities play a decisive role in interrupting this process. Historical evidence consistently shows that strong social bonds, credible local leadership, and inclusive civic institutions reduce susceptibility to extremist recruitment. When communities trust public institutions and feel represented within them, extremist narratives lose plausibility. Conversely, when communities are treated primarily as security risks rather than as partners, alienation deepens and informal social controls weaken. Prevention efforts that succeed tend to be those that enhance community resilience rather than impose external control.

Another lesson history teaches is that terrorism competes in a marketplace of meaning. Extremist movements offer their adherents identity, purpose, and moral certainty—often in contexts where legitimate avenues for meaning appear absent or discredited. Education alone has not proven sufficient to counter this appeal. While economic opportunity and civic education are important, they must be paired with credible moral frameworks that acknowledge grievance without sanctifying violence. Societies that neglect this struggle over meaning leave space for absolutist ideologies to fill the void.

Leadership and moral consistency are equally critical. Historical case studies demonstrate that counterterrorism efforts lose credibility when states abandon their professed values under pressure. Torture, indefinite detention, and extrajudicial practices may produce short-term intelligence gains, but they undermine the moral authority necessary for long-term prevention. Extremist movements thrive on examples of hypocrisy, using them to reinforce narratives of injustice and persecution. Leaders who model restraint, accountability, and proportionality during crises help deny future extremists the moral ammunition they seek.

Perhaps the most uncomfortable lesson is that the persistence of terrorism reflects not ignorance, but avoidance. The historical record clearly documents what fuels extremist violence and what mitigates it. Yet prevention strategies often clash with political incentives that favor immediate, visible action over long-term investment. Addressing radicalization requires patience, humility, and a willingness to confront social failures that are politically inconvenient. As a result, societies repeatedly default to reactive measures, rediscovering the same lessons after each new attack.

Preventing the next generation of terrorism ultimately means acting before the phenomenon has a name, a leader, or a flag. It requires viewing terrorism not as an external infection, but as a byproduct of unresolved grievances, fractured identities, and eroded trust. History does not suggest that terrorism can be eliminated entirely, but it does make clear that its appeal can be narrowed. The question is not whether the lessons are available, but whether societies are willing to apply them consistently, even when fear and anger make restraint difficult.

References

Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. Comparative Politics, 13(4), 379–399.

Horgan, J. (2008). From profiles to pathways and roots to routes: Perspectives from psychology on radicalization into terrorism. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618(1), 80–94.

Kydd, A. H., & Walter, B. F. (2006). The strategies of terrorism. International Security, 31(1), 49–80.

Neumann, P. R. (2013). The trouble with radicalization. International Affairs, 89(4), 873–893.

Pape, R. A. (2005). Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. Random House.

Federal Grand Jury Indicts Man on Terrorism and Arson Charges for Lighting Train Passenger on Fire and Setting Chicago City Hall Ablaze Days Earlier

CHICAGO — A federal grand jury in Chicago has indicted a man on terrorism and arson charges for allegedly lighting a passenger on fire on a Chicago Transit Authority train and setting fire to Chicago City Hall three days earlier.

The indictment against LAWRENCE REED, 50, of Chicago, was returned on Wednesday in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.  The charges in the indictment are punishable by a maximum sentence of life in federal prison.

The indictment renews the terrorism offense for which Reed was initially charged last month.  Reed allegedly approached a woman aboard a Chicago Transit Authority train on Nov. 17, 2025, ignited a bottle containing a liquid substance, and used it to light the victim on fire.  The victim was engulfed in flames but was able to depart the train.  She remains hospitalized with critical injuries. 

The indictment for the first time charges Reed with arson for allegedly setting a fire to Chicago City Hall on Nov. 14, 2025. The indictment accuses Reed of maliciously damaging and attempting to destroy the building, which is located at 121 N. LaSalle St. in downtown Chicago.

Reed was arrested by Chicago Police officers on Nov. 18, 2025, and he remains detained in federal custody without bond.  Arraignment for the charges in the indictment is scheduled for Dec. 19, 2025, at 12:00 p.m. before U.S. Magistrate Judge Laura K. McNally.

The indictment was announced by Andrew S. Boutros, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, Christopher Amon, Special Agent-in-Charge of the Chicago Field Division of the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, and Larry Snelling, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department.  Valuable assistance was provided by the Chicago Transit Authority.  The government is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Aaron R. Bond and Ronald L. DeWald.

The public is reminded that an indictment is not evidence of guilt.  The defendant is presumed innocent and entitled to a fair trial at which the government has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Justice Department Highlights Nationwide Crackdown on Tren de Aragua

WASHINGTON – The Department of Justice announced the unsealing of multiple indictments against more than 70 individuals, including leaders and members of designated foreign terrorist organization Tren de Aragua (TdA), linked to various violent crimes inside and outside the United States, including murder, robbery, extortion, kidnapping, money laundering, and controlled substance trafficking. These actions include indictments across five U.S. Attorney offices, including the District of Colorado, District of Nebraska, District of New Mexico, Southern District of New York, and the Southern District of Texas.

Since January 20, 2025, the Department has federally indicted over 260 members of TdA.  

“Immediately upon taking office, I directed the Department of Justice to fiercely pursue the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “This latest multi-state series of charges underscores the Trump Administration's unwavering commitment to restoring public safety, dismantling violent trafficking networks, and ridding our country of Tren de Aragua terrorists.”

“Tren de Aragua is a terrorist cartel that exploits our borders to bring murder, drugs, and chaos into American communities,” said Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche. “This Department is crushing their leadership, dismantling their networks, and cutting off their money across the United States. There will be no safe haven here. If you cross our border to commit violent crime, we will find you, prosecute you, and put you away.”

“The FBI is committed to investigating members of violent transnational gangs whose actions violate our laws and put American lives at risk,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “The existence of TdA is a direct threat to our national security, and we will not allow such a dangerous criminal organization to take root in our communities. Together with our law enforcement partners at every level, we are working to bring these ruthless criminals to justice.”

“Tren de Aragua is a ruthless, highly organized, and rapidly expanding foreign terrorist organization that thrives on chaos and human suffering,” said DEA Administrator Terrance Cole. “They exploit alliances with other terrorist-designated groups and transnational networks, including the FARC, ELN, and Cartel de los Soles, fueling instability, corruption, and violence across the region while endangering American communities. DEA is confronting this threat by relentlessly targeting their leadership, financial networks, and infrastructure. Those who align with TdA are standing against the United States and will face the full force of federal law enforcement.”

“The United States Marshals Service makes this point clear to all members of gangs like Tren de Aragua, we are coming for you,” said Gadyaces S. Serralta, Director of the United States Marshals Service. “We will not give you a moment of rest. We will find you. We will arrest you. You will be made to answer for your crimes. We will continue to work with all of our federal partners, to rid you from our country. Together, we are making the communities of America safer.”

“The foreign terrorist organization known as Tren de Aragua has used illicit firearms to maintain and expand control of its criminal enterprise, and imparted untold violence, widespread narcotics addiction, and death in American communities,” said Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Deputy Director Rob Cekada. “The men and women of ATF, along with our federal law enforcement partners, have worked tirelessly to bring the members of this organization to justice. We will continue to systematically dismantle Tren de Aragua and other foreign terrorist organizations to ensure our communities are protected from harm. The days of Tren de Aragua running roughshod over the American public, preying on, and profiting from American citizens is over.”

“These actions reflect the strength of our partnerships and our determination to dismantle criminal networks like Tren de Aragua,” said BOP Director William K. Marshall III. “The Federal Bureau of Prisons is proud to support this mission by providing critical intelligence and secure management of offenders, ensuring justice and safety for our communities.”

A case summary is below: 

Two alleged leaders of TdA have been indicted by a federal grand jury in connection with a series of crimes in Colorado. These defendants are facing several charges including a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) conspiracy. The indictment alleges that from May 2024 through on or about March of 2025, the defendants conducted activity for TdA through a pattern of racketeering activity that included robbery, extortion, kidnapping, money laundering and controlled substance offenses. The defendants are also charged with conspiracy to commit robbery and two counts of Hobbs Act Robbery and firearms offenses in connection with the armed robberies of two jewelry stores in the Denver, Colorado area in June of 2024.

A grand jury returned two indictments charging a total of 54 individuals, some associated with TdA, for leading and facilitating a large-scale conspiracy to use malware to steal millions of dollars from U.S. financial institutions by hacking ATMs. Charges against some of the defendants included conspiracy to provide material support for terrorism, in addition to conspiracies to commit bank fraud, money laundering, bank burglary, and computer fraud and abuse.

Federal prosecutors have indicted 11 alleged members and leaders of TdA on racketeering charges, accusing them of kidnapping, brutally interrogating, and strangling a victim in an Albuquerque apartment, before burying his body in a remote desert grave. Some defendants were also directly involved in an armed confrontation at an apartment complex in Aurora, Colorado, during which rival groups exchanged gunfire and a victim was killed.

An indictment has been unsealed charging Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, a/k/a “Nino Guerrero,” in connection with a leadership role in TdA operating throughout North America, South America, and Europe. For over a decade, Guerrero Flores has served as either the leader or co-leader of TdA, acting as the mastermind over TdA’s expansion across the Western Hemisphere. While operating from Venezuela and elsewhere, Guerrero Flores ordered, directed, facilitated, and supported acts of violence and terrorism transcending national boundaries, including murders, kidnappings, extortions, and maiming against victims located inside and outside the United States, and facilitated the transport of tons of cocaine from Venezuela to the United States. Guerrero Flores is currently at large, and the U.S. Department of State is offering rewards of up to $5 million for information leading to his arrest and/or conviction.

A six-count superseding indictment has been unsealed charging four Venezuelan nationals, including multiple alleged high-ranking members of TdA, for conspiring to provide and providing material support to TdA, and for conspiracy and distribution of cocaine in Colombia intended for distribution in the United States. According to court records, two of the defendants are some of the topmost TdA leaders, with one allegedly exercising command and control over all of TdA’s criminal operations, including the illegal importation and smuggling of gold and narcotics, extortion, and murder. The two other defendants are also high-ranking TdA leaders who operate out of multiple South American countries and direct operations to include gold smuggling, narcotics export and violent crime.

These cases are part of Joint Task Force Vulcan (JTFV), which was created in 2019 to eradicate MS-13 and now expanded at the direction of Attorney General Bondi to target Tren de Aragua. JTFV is comprised of U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the country. Those include Southern and Eastern Districts of New York; Eastern and Western Districts of North Carolina; Eastern and Western Districts of Virginia; Southern District of Florida; Eastern District of Texas; Western District of Oklahoma; Northern District of Indiana; and the District of Nevada; as well as the as well as the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys  Department of Justice’s National Security Division and the Criminal Division. Additionally, the FBI, DEA, HSI, ATF, USMS, and the Bureau of Prisons are essential law enforcement partners with JTFV. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs and the Criminal Division’s Office of Judicial Attaché in Bogotá, Colombia, has also provided significant assistance.

TdA is a violent transnational criminal organization that originated as a prison gang in Venezuela in the mid-2000s. TdA has expanded its criminal network throughout the Western Hemisphere and established a presence in the United States. TdA’s criminal activities include a variety of violent and criminal offenses, including drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, commercial sex trafficking, kidnapping, robbery, theft, fraud, and extortion. TdA members also commit murder, assault, and other acts of violence to enforce and further the organization’s criminal activities. TdA has also developed an additional source of revenue stream through financial crimes that target financial institutions throughout the United States, including using jackpotting to steal millions of dollars in cash.

An indictment is merely an allegation. The defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

Early Lessons from Bondi Beach: What the First Hours Reveal About Modern Terrorism

In the first hours after a mass-casualty terrorist attack, a society does two things at once. It grieves. And it tries to understand. Those tasks can collide: grief pulls toward meaning, certainty, and blame; disciplined analysis pulls toward restraint, verified facts, and patterns that can prevent the next attack. The Bondi Beach incident—an attack on a Hanukkah celebration at one of Australia’s most recognizable public spaces—forces that collision into the open. Even before every evidentiary detail is known, the early reporting and official statements already illuminate recurring features of modern terrorism: the continued preference for soft targets, compressed timelines, the power of narrative contagion, and the outsized importance of immediate response and communication. (Reuters)

The first lesson is the oldest: terrorism still chooses soft targets because soft targets create hard consequences. Bondi Beach was not selected for tactical advantage; it was selected for psychological effect. Open public gatherings offer crowds, visibility, and a sense of shared innocence—all qualities that amplify fear when violated. Attacking a religious celebration compounds that effect by signaling identity-based threat, not merely random violence. Early accounts describe the incident as an antisemitic terrorist attack and indicate the Jewish community was a specific focus of the assault, a detail that immediately shapes how communities interpret risk and how governments prioritize protection. This is precisely the kind of targeting that can trigger second-order harms—copycat threats, retaliatory anger, and long-term chilling of public life—unless leaders and institutions respond with clarity and unity. (AP News)

The second lesson is that “inspiration” can be operationally sufficient. In the Bondi reporting, officials described early indications that the attack was inspired by Islamic State ideology, and investigators have examined indicators such as alleged ISIS-associated flags and suspected explosive devices connected to the attackers. That matters because modern terrorism does not always require direct tasking by a centralized organization to achieve strategic effect. When a terrorist brand functions as a template—providing symbols, scripts, and legitimizing rhetoric—it can motivate violence that looks “leaderless” while still serving the broader purpose of spreading fear and polarizing societies. The operational burden on law enforcement and intelligence increases in this environment because the threat is less about intercepting communications and more about detecting shifts in intent, capability, and acceleration toward action. (Reuters)

A third lesson is that warning timelines are shrinking, and the gap between suspicion and proof can be deadly. Early reporting indicates one of the alleged gunmen was known to security services, but authorities still had no indication of a planned attack. That combination is not unusual in contemporary counterterrorism. Agencies may hold fragments—prior encounters, concerning speech, minor flags—without the specific, admissible, actionable intelligence that justifies intervention. This is the space where prevention is hardest: the pre-attack phase in which the threat is not yet a crime, the signals are ambiguous, and legal thresholds matter. The implication is not to lower standards indiscriminately, but to strengthen the connective tissue that turns weak signals into timely safeguards: improved threat reporting pathways, better integration between community concerns and investigative triage, and faster mechanisms for assessing risk when behavior shifts rapidly. (AP News)

The fourth lesson is that small-cell dynamics can produce strategic-scale outcomes. Authorities described the alleged perpetrators as a father and son, and multiple reports state one was killed at the scene and the other was hospitalized in critical condition. A two-person team can divide roles, reinforce commitment, and move from intent to execution quickly—especially if they already share trust, proximity, and privacy. Family-based or tightly bonded micro-cells reduce the visibility of planning to outsiders, narrowing opportunities for external disruption. For prevention, this underscores the importance of not romanticizing the “lone actor” category; many attacks occur in the gray zone of “small-cell terrorism” where the footprint is minimal but capability is real. (Reuters)

A fifth lesson emerges from the early investigative threads around travel and possible facilitation: modern extremist influence can be transnational even when perpetrators are locally embedded. Reuters reported that both alleged attackers traveled to the Philippines in the weeks before the assault, and authorities have been examining whether they had any link to terrorist networks or training—while also noting that such links were not conclusive at the time of reporting. This is a crucial analytical posture: follow the leads without overstating them. From a counterterrorism standpoint, the lesson is not that travel equals training; it is that travel, contact, and ideological consumption can create a mosaic of risk that must be evaluated quickly and cooperatively across borders. In the first days after an attack, the quality of international coordination—immigration records, digital traces, financial signals—often determines whether investigators can map facilitation pathways or confidently rule them out. (Reuters)

A sixth lesson is that response speed and decisive engagement remain the thin line between tragedy and catastrophe. The early narrative of Bondi includes accounts of immediate police engagement and community actions that may have limited further harm, along with reports of officers being seriously injured while intervening. In mass-casualty events, the most consequential decisions often occur before national leaders speak and before investigators convene: the first officers moving toward gunfire, the medics establishing triage, the bystanders choosing whether to run, hide, or help. Terrorism seeks to turn minutes into multipliers—more casualties, more panic, more chaos. Rapid, coordinated response denies that multiplier effect. That is not merely a tactical observation; it is a strategic one, because reducing casualties reduces the terrorist “victory narrative” and limits the emotional blast radius that fuels polarization. (AP News)

A seventh lesson concerns the “secondary battlefield” of information. In the first hours after Bondi, multiple outlets emphasized official cautions, the evolving nature of details, and the significance of accurate classification (terrorism versus other categories of violence). This matters because terrorism is performative: it is designed for audiences beyond the immediate victims. The information environment can inadvertently serve terrorist objectives when rumor outruns confirmation, when communities are collectively blamed, or when political rhetoric escalates faster than evidence. The Bondi coverage shows the familiar pressure points: identity-based fear, speculation about networks, and demands for immediate policy action. Early lesson: treat truth as an operational requirement. Governments, media, and civic leaders reduce harm when they communicate what is known, what is unknown, and what is being done—without filling gaps with insinuation. (Reuters)

An eighth lesson is that policy responses begin immediately, whether or not they are wise. Within days, reporting described New South Wales moving toward emergency gun law reforms and broader legal changes, while national leaders debated how to prevent recurrence in a country widely seen as having strong firearms regulation relative to many peers. This is a recurring pattern after terrorism: the incident becomes proof, and the political system is pressured to demonstrate control. Sometimes that yields durable improvements; sometimes it yields symbolic measures that miss the attacker’s actual pathway. The early lesson is not “act slowly.” It is “act precisely.” Policy made in the emotional heat of an attack should be grounded in the specific failure modes revealed by early evidence: licensing oversight, weapons acquisition, protective security for at-risk communities, threat reporting, and the interface between intelligence and local policing. Otherwise, the response risks becoming theater—comforting, visible, and strategically irrelevant. (Reuters)

A ninth lesson is about social cohesion as a counterterrorism capability. Terrorism is not only violence; it is an attempt to provoke societal fracture. When an attack targets a religious minority, the attacker’s hope is often twofold: terrorize the target community and provoke a broader backlash that deepens division, validating extremist narratives on all sides. Early reporting emphasized the shock of the attack and the national reckoning it triggered around antisemitism and violent extremism. In the first days, communal rituals—vigils, funerals, blood donations, public solidarity—do more than comfort the bereaved. They inoculate the public against the attacker’s political goal: turning fear into hatred. Resilience is not a slogan; it is an organized refusal to let terrorists choose the country’s next emotion. (Reuters)

Finally, Bondi underscores a disciplined conclusion: early lessons are about controlling what can be controlled. Investigations will determine the full chain of causality—how weapons were obtained, whether there were facilitators, what warning indicators existed, and what could have been disrupted. But the first hours already highlight enduring truths about modern terrorism: it exploits openness, compresses timelines, leverages ideology as a scalable toolkit, and seeks narrative dominance as much as physical harm. The best early response, therefore, is a blend of speed and restraint—rapid protection and medical action, paired with careful language, evidence-based policy, and unity that refuses collective blame. Terrorism aims to accelerate reaction. A society that can grieve without losing discipline denies terrorists the second victory they are always seeking: the reshaping of public life around fear. (Reuters)

References

Chen, C. (2025, December 16). Bondi gunmen were inspired by Islamic State, had travelled to the Philippines, Australia police say. Reuters.

Gelineau, K., Graham-McLay, C., & McGuirk, R. (2025, December 15). Father and son gunmen kill at least 15 people in attack on Hanukkah event at Sydney’s Bondi Beach. Associated Press.

Murdoch, S., & Jose, R. (2025, December 17). Australian state to pass emergency gun laws as funerals of Bondi attack victims begin. Reuters.

Reuters. (2025, December 16). Indian family of alleged Bondi gunman didn’t know of “radical mindset”, Indian police say. Reuters.

Australian Broadcasting Corporation. (2025, December 17). NSW parliament recalled to discuss gun reforms after Bondi Beach shooting. ABC News.

Doherty, B., Evershed, N., & Shimada, Y. (2025, December 15). Visual explainer: how a night of terror unfolded in Bondi. The Guardian.

Associated Press. (2025, December 16). Australia to hold funerals for the 15 victims of an antisemitic mass shooting at Bondi Beach. Associated Press. (Reuters)

Terror Without a Future: Inside the Turtle Island Liberation Front and the Foiled New Year’s Eve Terror Plot

Recent federal prosecutions connected to a foiled New Year’s Eve attack plot in Southern California provide a revealing case study of contemporary domestic terrorism. Public reporting identifies the alleged actors as members of a small, ideologically driven group referred to as the Turtle Island Liberation Front. While the legal process will ultimately determine individual guilt, the facts described in charging documents and mainstream reporting align closely with established research on small-cell domestic extremist organizations. Examining this case through a combined tactical and strategic lens helps clarify both the immediate danger such groups can pose and the structural limitations that undermine their long-term effectiveness.

At the strategic level, the ideology attributed to the Turtle Island Liberation Front reflects a familiar pattern in modern domestic extremism. Rather than a coherent political program, such groups typically assemble a constellation of grievances—anti-government sentiment, anti-capitalist rhetoric, and identity-based narratives—into a flexible moral framework that justifies violence. Scholars have noted that this type of ideological hybridity allows groups to rationalize attacks on a wide range of targets while avoiding the internal discipline required to pursue sustained political change (Hoffman, 2017). Ideology, in this context, functions less as a roadmap to an achievable end state and more as a psychological accelerator for action.

Strategic objectives in cases like this tend to be demonstrative rather than transformative. Small domestic cells rarely possess the capacity to coerce governments or reshape policy. Instead, they seek attention, disruption, and symbolic impact. Research consistently shows that terrorism in democratic societies almost never achieves its stated political aims, particularly when it relies on limited violence by marginal actors (Abrahms, 2012). Violence becomes a substitute for relevance, not a pathway to power. The resulting strategy is inherently self-limiting: the more spectacular the act, the greater the backlash and isolation.

Organizational structure further constrains long-term viability. Groups such as the Turtle Island Liberation Front, as described in public reporting, appear to operate as small, trust-based cells with minimal hierarchy. While decentralization can complicate detection, it also makes organizations fragile. The arrest or defection of a single participant can compromise communications, logistics, and planning. Studies of domestic terrorism in the United States show that most plots are disrupted early, often due to informants, intercepted communications, or observable preparatory behavior rather than complex intelligence operations (Department of Homeland Security, 2019).

Tactically, however, these groups can still be dangerous. The alleged plot reportedly focused on symbolic or systemic targets rather than military objectives. This targeting logic is consistent with longstanding terrorist behavior, in which violence is designed to communicate meaning rather than achieve battlefield success (Crenshaw, 2011). Infrastructure, commercial facilities, and government-associated sites carry symbolic weight and offer the promise of outsized psychological impact relative to the resources required to attack them.

The methods associated with small domestic cells are typically low-cost and improvised. Research drawn from decades of incident data demonstrates that most domestic terrorist attacks rely on readily available materials and simple weapons rather than sophisticated systems (START, 2023). Improvised explosive devices and other low-tech methods remain attractive precisely because they do not require external support networks. While technically unsophisticated, such methods are often sufficient to cause casualties and public fear.

Operational tradecraft is frequently the decisive weakness. Small cells tend to overestimate their own security, relying on commercial messaging platforms, informal rehearsals, and poorly concealed logistics. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has repeatedly observed that domestic terrorism plots are commonly disrupted because participants communicate openly, test materials in observable settings, or confide in individuals who later cooperate with authorities (FBI, 2023). These failures are not incidental; they are a structural feature of groups driven by urgency and grievance rather than discipline and patience.

Timing choices also reveal the blend of intent and vulnerability. Plots scheduled around symbolic dates such as holidays are intended to maximize attention and fear. Yet these same dates coincide with heightened public awareness and increased law enforcement vigilance. The desire for spectacle thus creates an inherent contradiction: the conditions that promise maximum psychological impact also increase the likelihood of detection and disruption.

From a strategic forecasting perspective, the principal risk posed by groups like the Turtle Island Liberation Front lies less in organizational survival than in narrative replication. Even when a specific cell is dismantled, its story can inspire unaffiliated individuals who share similar grievances. This phenomenon of imitation complicates prevention efforts but does not alter the underlying strategic reality. Without broad legitimacy, sustainable financing, or disciplined organization, such groups rarely evolve into enduring movements.

Ultimately, the foiled New Year’s Eve plot underscores a recurring truth in terrorism studies. Small, ideologically motivated domestic cells can pose real short-term danger, but they operate at a strategic dead end. Their violence generates attention without influence, fear without power, and disruption without durable change. When societies respond with measured law enforcement rather than panic, the logic of terrorism collapses. In that sense, terror without a future is not merely a descriptive phrase; it is an analytical conclusion grounded in decades of evidence.

References

Abrahms, M. (2012). The political effectiveness of terrorism revisited. Comparative Political Studies, 45(3), 366–393.

Crenshaw, M. (2011). Explaining terrorism: Causes, processes and consequences. Routledge.

Department of Homeland Security. (2019). Strategic framework for countering terrorism and targeted violence.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2023). Domestic terrorism: Definitions, threats, and trends. FBI Counterterrorism Division publications.

Hoffman, B. (2017). Inside terrorism (2nd ed.). Columbia University Press.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2023). Global Terrorism Database overview and trends. University of Maryland.

What Terrorism Is Really Trying to Destroy

Terrorism seeks fear, not victory—and history shows why it almost always fails.

Terrorism is most often understood through moments of rupture: the blast, the headline, the rolling footage that loops until fear feels permanent. Yet terrorism is not an event. It is a strategy. Its true battlefield is not a street or a building, but the human mind and the civic trust that binds a society together. To understand terrorism clearly, one must look past the violence itself and ask what it is really trying to destroy.

At its core, terrorism is the deliberate use of violence or the threat of violence against civilians to advance political, religious, or ideological goals. Unlike conventional warfare, it does not seek to defeat an opposing army or occupy territory. Its aim is psychological disruption. Terrorism depends on fear, symbolism, and attention. A single act is designed to echo far beyond its physical damage, unsettling millions who were never directly touched by the attack itself.

Open societies are particularly vulnerable to this tactic. Democracies value transparency, free movement, open spaces, and a free press. These are strengths, but they also create exposure. Terrorist acts exploit visibility and amplification. The September 11, 2001 attacks illustrate this dynamic with brutal clarity. Nineteen hijackers inflicted catastrophic loss of life, yet the deeper impact unfolded in the weeks and years that followed: mass fear, altered travel behavior, sweeping security policies, and prolonged national anxiety. The attacks succeeded in commanding attention worldwide, but they failed in their stated objective of weakening American resolve or collapsing its institutions. Instead, they triggered institutional adaptation and long-term counterterrorism cooperation across nations.

Fear is the true weapon. Terrorism works by introducing randomness into daily life. Ordinary routines—commuting, gathering, celebrating—are transformed into perceived risks. The 2005 London bombings demonstrate this effect. Four suicide bombers targeted the city’s public transportation system during morning rush hour, killing 52 civilians. The choice of trains and buses was intentional: everyday spaces used by ordinary people. Yet within days, London’s transit system resumed full operation, and public messaging emphasized continuity rather than panic. The long-term psychological shock was real, but the attempt to paralyze civic life failed. The city adapted without surrendering its openness.

Terrorism is not merely violence; it is narrative. Every act carries a message meant to provoke response. Terrorist movements rely on mythology—stories of oppression, destiny, purity, or vengeance. These narratives demand recognition through spectacle. However, they also depend on their enemies to overreact. The Islamic State’s campaign of mass-casualty attacks in Europe between 2015 and 2017 was explicitly designed to provoke polarization, inspire collective punishment, and validate its apocalyptic worldview. While those attacks caused profound suffering, the group ultimately lost nearly all of its territorial holdings by 2019 and saw its global appeal diminish as brutality alienated populations it claimed to defend.

This reveals terrorism’s central weakness. The power it projects is largely illusory. While it can destroy, it cannot build. While it can disrupt, it cannot govern. Terrorist movements struggle to translate fear into sustainable political outcomes. Violence against civilians undermines legitimacy, fractures internal cohesion, and provokes resistance both domestically and internationally. Even when terror temporarily dominates headlines, it rarely reshapes societies in the way its perpetrators intend.

The greatest danger terrorism poses is not only the harm it causes, but the moral risk it creates for the society under attack. In the aftermath of September 11, debates over surveillance, detention, and civil liberties revealed how fear can pressure democratic norms. Terrorism succeeds when societies abandon restraint, erode due process, or normalize suspicion. When this happens, terror achieves indirectly what it cannot accomplish directly.

Resilient societies respond differently. They recognize that justice, proportionality, and lawful restraint are not weaknesses but sources of strength. Effective counterterrorism depends as much on preserving trust as on preventing attacks. Courts that function, laws that endure, and institutions that remain accountable deny terrorism its ultimate objective: the corrosion of civic confidence.

In the end, terrorism fails because it misunderstands human societies. Fear is powerful, but it is not permanent. Communities rebuild. Daily life resumes. Institutions adapt. The quiet return to routine—the reopening of streets, the balancing of justice, the continued movement of ordinary people—undercuts the very logic of terror. Violence may interrupt life, but it cannot define it.

Terrorism is a test, not only of security systems, but of character. The measure of a society is found not in how loudly it reacts, but in how faithfully it preserves its values under pressure. Courage, restraint, and moral clarity are not abstract ideals; they are practical defenses. A society that remains committed to justice and order denies terrorism the victory it seeks, proving that fear, however dramatic, is ultimately fleeting.

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References (APA format)

BBC News. (2015). Paris attacks: What happened on the night. British Broadcasting Corporation.

Byman, D. (2017). ISIS goes global: Fight the Islamic State by targeting its affiliates. Brookings Institution.

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Silke, A. (2008). Terrorism. In P. Wilkinson (Ed.), Homeland security in the UK. Routledge.

Historic Homeland Security Task Force New York Targets Foreign Terrorists, Cartel Members, And Criminal Organizations With Ties To Big Apple

United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Jay Clayton, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Joseph Nocella, Jr., Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), Christopher G. Raia, Special Agent in Charge of the New York Field Office of Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”), Ricky J. Patel, Special Agent in Charge of the New York Field Office of Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation (“IRS-CI”), Harry T. Chavis, Jr., and Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), Jessica S. Tisch, joined federal partners on Dec. 10 to announce the establishment of the Homeland Security Task Force (“HSTF”) New York.

Co-led by HSI and the FBI, the HSTF New York will serve as a first-of-its-kind task force that utilizes a whole-of-government approach to identify, disrupt and dismantle criminal cartels, foreign gangs, and transnational criminal organizations (“TCOs”) in New York and throughout the United States.

“We hear what New Yorkers want: they want our parks, schools, housing developments, subways, and streets to be safe and feel safe,” said U.S. Attorney Jay Clayton.  “Together with our federal partners and the NYPD, the Southern District is committed to delivering safe streets and a better quality of life for all New Yorkers.  In the last year, we have collectively investigated and charged: members of Tren de Aragua and many other brutally violent gangs with murders, sex trafficking, and narcotics distribution; over a dozen narco-terrorists and members of state-sponsored drug cartels with narcotics distribution; foreign nationals with fentanyl distribution; and most recently, 18 defendants in a wide narcotics sweep aimed at cleaning up Washington Square Park.  The women and men of the SDNY are actively engaged in similar matters and are committed to making New York safer each and every day.”

“The historic collaboration of this Task Force strengthens the mission to protect our citizens by standing between our Districts and the transnational criminal organizations, human smugglers, and cybercriminals who target us with drug trafficking, violence, and economic harm,” said U.S. Attorney Joseph Nocella, Jr.

“FBI New York proudly stands alongside our federal, state, and local partners to co-lead with HSI New York the New York Homeland Security Task Force,” said FBI Assistant Director in Charge Christopher G. Raia.  “By bringing the full force of the federal government, this task force will dismantle designated terrorist enterprises who are responsible for trafficking lethal drugs and weapons into our communities.  Through unified partnership, we will continue to defend the homeland from evolving threats, safeguard critical infrastructure, and strengthen national resilience.”

“The people of this city deserve to know that special agents and investigators at every level of law enforcement are standing side-by-side and collaborating under one roof, so that New Yorkers may go about their lives safely and comfortably,” said HSI Special Agent in Charge Ricky J. Patel.  “The HSTF New York and HSI, as its co-leader, are driving coordinated investigations that strike at the heart of criminal networks and schemes both here and abroad.  With unity as our strength and coordination as our advantage, we will outpace, outsmart, and outmaneuver transnational criminal organizations at every turn.”

“We are proud to have entered into this agreement with the New York Homeland Security Task Force as a partner and as the third agency on the Executive Committee,” said IRS-CI Special Agent in Charge Harry T. Chavis, Jr.  “Whether it is money laundering, Bank Secrecy Act violations, a complex financial fraud, or leveraging our tax authority, we will continue working in tandem with all the agencies under the HSTF umbrella to take criminals off the street and dismantle transnational criminal organizations.  Special Agents with IRS Criminal Investigation have long been known for lending their financial and tax expertise to complex investigations.  With this agreement, our special agents will continue to proactively leverage our knowledge and unique skills for the betterment of this new team.”

The mission of the HSTF is to identify and target for prosecution transnational criminal organizations engaged in diverse criminal schemes involving a myriad of federal violations both within the United States and throughout the world.  Violations include, but are not limited to drug trafficking, money laundering, weapons trafficking, human trafficking, alien smuggling, homicide, extortion, kidnapping, weapons trafficking, and other TCO- related violations where there is or may be a federal investigative interest.

HSTF New York will primarily focus on investigating TCO Foreign Terrorist Organizations (“FTOs”), and is working towards the disruption and full dismantlement of these criminal organizations, combining the full strength of the investigative and intelligence forces of the U.S. government.  One key component of the HSTF is the ability to combine information from our intelligence community partners with our law enforcement investigations to increase our effectiveness in combatting and dismantling the threat.

This task force model allows state, local, and federal law enforcement to extend our reach, share intelligence in real time, and target these threats at every level.

HSTF New York is comprised of law enforcement personnel from state and local law enforcement, including the NYPD, and federal entities from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, the Department of State, the Department of War, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of Labor.  Participating agencies include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Diplomatic Security Service; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the New York City Police Department (NYPD); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Marshals Service – Eastern District of New York; U.S. Marshals Service – Southern District of New York; U.S. Postal Inspection Service; and the U.S. Secret Service.

*                *                *

More About the Homeland Security Task Force (“HSTF”)

Homeland Security Task Forces (“HSTFs”) nationwide arrested more than 3,200 foreign terrorists, narcotraffickers, and gangbangers, and seized more than 91 metric tons of narcotics off American streets between August 25 and October 7 alone.

Prior to the creation of HSTF, the federal government had 1,000 competing task forces focused on transnational criminal organizations.  Since January, HSTF has established a new system and force in all 50 states and U.S. territories while coordinating and implementing operations with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners.  Department of War and Intelligence Community partners are also providing HSTF with logistics, intelligence, and operational support.

On August 25, HSTF officially launched its effort to protect the Homeland with a September Surge encompassing 400 operations nationwide. In just 43 days, HSTF’s nationwide operations resulted in 3,266 arrests and seizures including:

• 1,041 Sinaloa members,
• 856 Cartel Jalisco Nuevo Genaracion (“CJNG”) members,
• 641 MS-13 members,
• 456 Tren de Aragua members,
• 1,067 weapons
• More than $3,250,000 in currency
• Approximately 91 metric tons of narcotics

The HSTF will absorb several key components of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (“OCDETF”), which has now been retired, to serve as the foundation of the HSTFs, to include critical databases previously utilized by OCDETF, OCDETF Strike Force infrastructure, partnerships, and funding.

HSTFs differ from Safe Street Task Forces (“SSTF”) by focusing on combating multijurisdictional TCOs operating across national borders, while the SSTF will continue to focus on targeting domestic gangs and violence reduction efforts in partnership with state and local law enforcement.  When feasible, SSTF investigations could be enhanced by HSTF resources for maximum impact.

HSTFs differ from Joint Terrorism Task Forces (“JTTF”) by focusing on combating multijurisdictional cartel and international gang TCOs operating across national borders with the ultimate goal to disrupt and dismantle these organizations through prosecution while JTTF will continue to focus on protecting the homeland from foreign and domestic, ideological-based terrorism. 

Koreatown Man Charged with Throwing Two Molotov Cocktails Inside Federal Building in Downtown Los Angeles

LOS ANGELES – A Koreatown man was charged today with throwing Molotov cocktails at security officers inside a federal building in downtown Los Angeles, an attack law enforcement believes was motivated by anti-immigration enforcement sentiment.

Jose Francisco Jovel, 54, was arrested Monday and is charged with attempted malicious damage of federal property.

Jovel is expected to make his initial appearance on Wednesday in United States District Court in Los Angeles.

“This case exemplifies how misleading and hateful rhetoric against federal law enforcement can and does result in violence,” said First Assistant United States Attorney Bill Essayli. “Irresponsible rhetoric by politicians and activists have real-world consequences. It must stop.”

“There can be zero tolerance for any targeting of law enforcement officials – let alone violent acts – and we’re lucky that the devices allegedly thrown by the subject did not physically injure anyone,” said Akil Davis, the Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office. “The FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force is dedicated to investigating and holding accountable anyone who conducts targeted attacks against government employees.”

According to an affidavit filed with the complaint, Jovel – who hours earlier had set his Koreatown apartment on fire after receiving an eviction notice – arrived Monday morning at the Federal Building, located in the Civic Center of downtown Los Angeles. Jovel arrived outside the building with multiple shopping bags. The Federal Building houses offices for several federal agencies, including United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

While standing at the base of the stairs outside the building’s main entrance, Jovel reached into one of the bags on his bicycle’s handlebars and then threw a Molotov cocktail through the building’s sliding door, which was open at the time, and is marked as an employee entrance.

Jovel then threw another Molotov cocktail through the then-open door of the Federal Building’s public entrance, where a line of members of the public were waiting to go through security to enter the building.

Evidence collected from the scene, including surveillance video, indicates Jovel attempted to light at least one of the devices.

Federal officers immediately arrested Jovel then searched the bags he brought with him, which included a lighter and five additional Molotov cocktails. During his arrest, Jovel said he was motivated by his anger at the federal government of its immigration policies and actions.

Jovel described his actions as “a terrorist attack” and said to the officers, “you’re separating families” – a remark commonly made by opponents of current United States government immigration policies. He then yelled for people to “start shooting these,” referring to the officers.

A complaint contains allegations that a defendant has committed a crime. Every defendant is presumed to be innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in court.

If convicted, Jovel would face a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in federal prison and a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years in federal prison.

The FBI is investigating this matter with assistance from the Federal Protective Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Homeland Security Investigations, the Los Angeles Police Department, and the Los Angeles Fire Department.

Assistant United States Attorney Jenna W. Long of the National Security Division is prosecuting this case.

Man Charged for Planting Explosive Devices outside the RNC and DNC on January 5, 2021

            WASHINGTON – Brian J. Cole, Jr., 30, of Woodbridge, Virginia, was arrested this morning and charged for transporting and planting two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on January 5, 2021, at the headquarters of both the Republican National Committee and the Democratic National Committee in Washington D.C., announced U.S. Attorney Jeanine Ferris Pirro.

            Cole is charged in a complaint unsealed today with transporting an explosive device in interstate commerce with the intent to kill, injure, or intimidate any individual or unlawfully to damage or destroy any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property. He is also charged with attempted malicious destruction by means of fire and explosive materials.

            Joining in the announcement were U.S. Attorney General Pamela Bondi, FBI Director Kash Patel, FBI Deputy Director Dan Bongino, FBI Assistant Director in Charge Darren B. Cox of the Washington Field Office, and Chief Pamela A. Smith of the Metropolitan Police Department.

            “The well-being of our society rests on our ability as law enforcement to safeguard our citizens,” said U.S. Attorney Pirro. “When bad actors intervene to disrupt and threat that peace – to destroy the very fabric of our country – we must, we do, and we will track them down and hold them to account for their crimes to the full extent of the law. FBI and members of my office worked around the clock to methodically piece together the clues that ultimately identified the defendant.”

            “Today’s arrest was the result of good, diligent police work and collaboration on a case that languished for four years under the prior administration,” said Attorney General Bondi. “The American people are safer thanks to this morning’s successful operation.”

            “The investigation into the pipe bombs in Washington, D.C. has been a high priority since Deputy Director Bongino and I assumed our roles nine months ago. Since that time, our FBI teams have gone back over every fact and every data point looking for new leads – and today’s arrest is the result of that outstanding work,” said FBI Director Patel. “Although almost five years have passed, this shows the FBI will never rest in bringing justice to those who endanger American lives and our communities. I would like to thank our Washington Field Office, FBI personnel across the country, and our partners for their hard work and dedication which led to this arrest.”

“This historic arrest shows this FBI delivers on its promises to protect the American people,” said FBI Deputy Director Bongino. “The pipe bombs could have caused devastating loss of life and injuries, as well as property damage. I want to thank the FBI employees who worked on this over the years, our law enforcement partners who assisted in the investigation, and the American people for the tips they shared with us.” 

            "Today's actions underscore the long memory and reach of the FBI," said FBI’s Cox, the Assistant Director in Charge of the Washington Field Office. "The FBI and our partners do not forget. We do not give up. We do not relent. For nearly five years, the investigative team combed through a massive amount of data and leads to identify the suspect arrested today."

           According to the complaint, during 2019 and 2020, Cole purchased multiple components consistent with those used to manufacture the two IEDs at several retailers in northern Virginia.

            At approximately 1 p.m. on Jan. 6, 2021, multiple law enforcement agencies received reports of a suspected IEDs near the headquarters of the RNC in Washington, D.C. About 1:15 p.m. the same day, a second suspected IED was reported just a few blocks away near the headquarters of the DNC.

            The Hazardous Devices Section of the United States Capitol Police (USCP) neutralized both devices. Subsequently, the FBI assessed that the two devices contained a main explosive charge, a fuzing system, and a container.

            Video surveillance determined that the same individual placed the devices on the evening of January 5, 2021. The suspect had been wearing dark pants, a grey hooded sweatshirt, dark gloves, Nike Air Max Speed Turf shoes, and a facemask that obscured the person’s face. The video showed the individual adjusting eyeglasses and carrying a backpack.

            On January 5, 2021, about  7:10 p.m., Cole’s Nissan Sentra was observed driving past a License Plate Reader at the South Capitol Street exit from I-395 South, which is less than one-half mile from the location where the individual who placed the devices was first observed on foot near North Carolina and New Jersey Avenues, Southeast.

            Cell phone records further show that Cole’s cell phone communicated with cell towers in the area of the RNC and DNC on January 5, 2021, between 7:39 p.m. and 8:24 p.m. The FBI’s Cellular Analysis and Survey Team determined that the location of Cole’s cell phone during this period corresponded with the path of the suspect identified by the FBI through analysis of video from that day.

            This investigation is being conducted by the FBI Washington Field Office, the U.S. Capitol Police, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Metropolitan Police Department, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. It is being prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. 

Pentagon Provides Update on Operation Southern Spear, Reaffirms Socom Called for Second Strike on Drug Boat

Dec. 2, 2025 | By Matthew Olay, Pentagon News |

The War Department provided an update today on the U.S. military's counter-narco-terrorism campaign, Operation Southern Spear, including the casualties inflicted upon suspected narco-terrorists and a reemphasis on how the operation's first kinetic boat strike unfolded.

To date, a total of 21 kinetic strikes in U.S. Southern Command's area of operations have taken place, resulting in 82 narco-terrorists having been killed, Pentagon Press Secretary Kingsley Wilson told the media.

"Each strike conducted against these designated terror organizations is taken in defense of vital U.S. national interests and to protect the homeland," Wilson said.

 She added that the legality of the strikes has been thoroughly vetted by the proper authorities. 

"Our operations in the Southcom region are lawful under both U.S. and international law, with all actions in compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict. These actions have also been approved by the best military and civilian lawyers up and down the chain of command," Wilson said. 

Along the lines of legality, Wilson also underscored White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt's statement yesterday that a "double tap" strike on an alleged Venezuelan narco-terrorism boat on Sept. 2 was ordered by U.S. Special Operations Command's top leader, Navy Adm. Frank "Mitch" Bradley, and not Secretary of War Pete Hegseth.

A recent article published late last week claiming that Hegseth ordered the second strike has been a source of contention between President Donald J. Trump's administration, some members of Congress and the media.    

"As the White House confirmed yesterday, the decision to restrike the narco-terrorists' vessel was made by Adm. Bradley, operating under clear and long-standing authorities to ensure the boat was destroyed and the threat to the United States was eliminated," Wilson told the media.  

"Let's make one thing crystal clear: Adm. Mitch Bradley is an American hero, a true professional, and [he] has my 100% support," Hegseth said via a social media post yesterday.  

"I stand by him and the combat decisions he has made — on the September 2 mission and all others since. America is fortunate to have such men protecting us," he added.

Wilson ended the Operation Southern Spear portion of her briefing by reemphasizing the War Department's commitment to protecting the American people. 

"This department will defend our homeland. This is not a catchphrase; it's a commitment," she said. "And, as [Hegseth] said: When it comes to killing narco-terrorists, we have only just begun."