By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, April 30, 2014 – While Afghan security forces
did an outstanding job protecting their people during the April election, they
are not yet ready to shoulder the burden alone, according to the Defense Department’s
congressionally mandated semiannual Report on Security and Stability in
Afghanistan.
The report, released to Congress today, said Afghan forces
grew in numbers and capabilities over the reporting period that ended March 31,
and held their own against the insurgency.
Disrupting the April 5 election was an insurgent goal, yet
their “territorial and kinetic capabilities remained static,” according to the
report.
The election was a test of Afghan forces and the electoral
process, and all reports indicate they did well. “The [Afghan national security
forces] and Afghan election institutions laid the groundwork for a successful
election, registering millions of voters and securing thousands of polling
sites, with minimal international assistance,” the report said. “These
preparations far surpassed Afghanistan’s efforts in the 2009 and 2010
elections.”
Afghan forces defended the election sites and prevented
high-profile attacks across the country. Voter turnout was high.
The election is just one example of the real progress
Afghanistan has made, the report says, noting that the government maintains
control of the cities and all provincial capitals. Insurgent attacks are away
from these centers. Polling data shows most Afghans view the security forces
favorably. Afghan forces now conduct almost all operations independently.
American and coalition casualties are a quarter of what they
were in 2010, the report says, and violence indicators are down from a year
ago. These include a 2 percent drop in enemy-initiated attacks, an 8 percent
drop in complex attacks and a 24 percent drop in improvised explosive device
events.
Still, there are challenges. Logistics and sustainment
capabilities lag well behind the operational progress. “Afghan National Army
attrition was higher than its target, and corruption continued,” the report
says. “Although the International Security Assistance Force continues to
develop capabilities, [Afghan forces require] more time and effort to close
four key high-end capability gaps that will remain after the ISAF mission ends
on December 31, 2014: air support; intelligence enterprise; special operations;
and Afghan security ministry capacity.”
International funding and coalition force assistance will be
critical to sustaining the force after 2014, the report says. If a second-round
runoff election is required -- and indications today are that it will be --
securing the runoff during the summer fighting season will test Afghan forces.
But uncertainties dog signs of progress. Afghan President
Hamid Karzai’s refusal to sign the already negotiated bilateral security
agreement with the United States means uncertainty for what follows the end of
the International Security Assistance Force mission. No coalition country can
forecast their post-2014 presence. The Taliban are trying to capitalize on the
absence of an agreement to instill fear among Afghans.
While NATO planning has been for a post-2014 force to train
and advise with 8,000 to 12,000 troops, President Barack Obama has not yet made
any decision on the number of U.S. troops that may be kept in Afghanistan if
the Afghan government signs the agreement.
Part of this effort is because of the lack of logistics
expertise. From the ministries down to the tactical level, Afghanistan’s
national government faced a major challenge in developing an effective,
integrated logistics and sustainment system for the Afghan forces, the report
says, adding that a lack of trained maintenance technicians, combined with a
logistics system that struggled to resupply units in the field, adversely
affected every component of Afghanistan’s security forces. Afghan forces relied
on coalition forces for limited enabler support, particularly in the areas of
close-air support, casualty evacuation, logistics, counter-IED, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Problems in the government mean Afghanistan cannot
capitalize on security gains. “Challenges in governance and sustainable
economic development slowed the reinforcement and consolidation of security
gains,” the report says. “Ongoing insurgent activity and influence inhibited
economic development and improvements in governance. Predatory corruption,
criminal patronage, weak rule of law, and reliance on the funding for the
insurgency from narco-trafficking are factors which hindered the ability of the
[Afghan forces and the national government’s local] governance structures to
maintain a secure environment and provide essential service delivery.”
Immature infrastructure exacerbates these problems, the
report adds.
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