Wednesday, October 21, 2026

When Terror Isn't Terrorism: The American School Shooting Paradox

There is something profoundly troubling about the way Americans distinguish between terrorism and mass murder. When an individual enters a public place and murders innocent people to advance a political or religious cause, we generally recognize the act as terrorism. Yet when another individual enters an elementary school, murders children and teachers, and leaves an entire community traumatized, we frequently describe the perpetrator as a mass shooter rather than a terrorist. The victims are equally dead, the families equally devastated, and the communities equally frightened. Nevertheless, the classification changes, often because of what investigators believe motivated the perpetrator. This distinction raises an important question: If terrorism is fundamentally about creating fear through violence, why aren't more American school shootings classified as acts of domestic terrorism?

The answer involves statutory definitions, investigative practices, academic interpretations, and the sometimes ambiguous motivations behind mass violence. It also exposes a tension between how terrorism is legally defined and how terror is actually experienced. From the perspective of a grieving parent, the ideological convictions of the murderer may seem considerably less important than the deliberate selection of children as targets. Yet criminal law cannot simply disregard motive, because the distinction between the consequences of violence and the intentions behind it remains central to determining the nature of an offense.

The Legal Definition and the Question of Intent

Federal law provides a starting point. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5), domestic terrorism involves criminal acts dangerous to human life that occur primarily within the United States and appear intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence government policy through intimidation or coercion, or affect government conduct through mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. An important feature of this definition is what it does not say. The statutory language does not explicitly require allegiance to a political movement, religious organization, or ideological cause. Instead, one of its central provisions concerns the intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population. Moreover, the three statutory purposes are alternatives; satisfying one can be sufficient to meet the intent element of the definition.

Consider an individual who deliberately attacks an elementary school because he wants parents throughout the country to fear sending their children to school. The perpetrator may have no recognizable political philosophy, no membership in an extremist organization, and no interest in influencing an election or legislative decision. Nevertheless, his stated objective is to intimidate a civilian population through lethal violence. Such an attack could satisfy the statutory definition of domestic terrorism, provided the other statutory elements were also met. The difficulty arises when investigators attempt to distinguish between the intention to create widespread fear and the fear that inevitably results from mass violence. A perpetrator motivated by revenge, humiliation, personal grievances, or a desire for notoriety may generate the same widespread terror as someone pursuing an ideological objective, but producing terror as a consequence is not necessarily equivalent to intending terror as an objective.

Federal law also distinguishes between the definition of domestic terrorism and the narrower category of a federal crime of terrorism. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5), the latter requires an enumerated federal offense calculated to influence or affect government conduct through intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct. Furthermore, there is no general standalone federal criminal offense simply named domestic terrorism. Consequently, an incident may satisfy the broader definition without supporting a terrorism-specific criminal charge. This distinction is important because describing an act as terrorism, investigating it as terrorism, and successfully prosecuting it under a terrorism-related federal statute are not necessarily the same things.

The FBI's operational approach adds another dimension. In its 2020 report, Domestic Terrorism: Definitions, Terminology, and Methodology, the FBI and Department of Homeland Security described domestic terrorism incidents using a framework that emphasizes criminal violence committed in furtherance of domestic ideological goals. The federal statute focuses on the apparent intention to intimidate or coerce, while the FBI's methodology for recording domestic terrorism incidents additionally emphasizes ideological objectives. Those objectives need not be confined to conventional political or religious movements, and the absence of an obvious political affiliation does not necessarily exclude an incident from consideration as domestic terrorism. Nevertheless, the distinction between the statutory definition and the investigative framework raises legitimate questions about how certain acts of mass violence are classified, particularly when a perpetrator's primary objective appears to be widespread intimidation rather than the advancement of a recognizable political cause.

Where Mass Shootings and Terrorism Converge

Academic research suggests that the conventional separation between mass shootings and terrorism may be less clear than it initially appears. In a 2021 study published in Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, Lance Hunter, Martha Humphries Ginn, Scott Storyllewellyn, and Joshua Rutland examined 105 American mass shootings occurring between 1982 and October 2018. They evaluated the incidents against four criteria commonly associated with terrorism: ideological or social motivation, an intention to reach a wider audience, the absence of personal financial gain, and the identification of an enemy or opposing group. Their findings were striking. Forty-one incidents, approximately 39 percent, satisfied all four criteria, while another 45, approximately 43 percent, satisfied three. In total, approximately 82 percent of the incidents satisfied at least three of the researchers' four criteria.

These findings do not establish that 82 percent of American mass shootings legally qualify as terrorism. The researchers employed their own analytical framework rather than conducting judicial determinations, and their study examined mass shootings generally rather than school shootings exclusively. Nevertheless, the findings raise questions about the consistency with which mass violence is distinguished from terrorism. They also suggest that the motivations and behaviors associated with terrorist violence may be present in incidents that receive substantially different classifications. This does not mean that those classifications are necessarily incorrect, but it does indicate that the dividing line deserves closer examination.

Other researchers have emphasized the importance of distinguishing among perpetrators. In a 2019 Journal of Forensic Sciences study, Joel Capellan and colleagues examined 318 mass public shootings from 1966 through 2017. They identified differences among disgruntled employees, school shooters, ideologically motivated offenders, and other rampage shooters, particularly regarding motivations, planning, and target selection. Glenn Muschert reached a related conclusion in his 2007 review, Research in School Shootings, published in Sociology Compass, distinguishing rampage shootings, school-related mass murders, terrorist attacks, targeted shootings, and other categories. Collectively, these studies demonstrate that mass shooters are not a homogeneous population and that treating every incident as identical would obscure distinctions that may help investigators identify threats and prevent future violence.

The debate, therefore, should not revolve around whether every school shooter is a terrorist. Clearly, they are not necessarily so under established definitions. Instead, the more productive question concerns whether some perpetrators presently classified primarily as mass murderers also exhibit motivations and behaviors consistent with terrorism. Consider the symbolic importance of the target. Schools represent childhood, public trust, education, and the expectation that communities will protect their most vulnerable members. An attack on a school can therefore communicate something beyond hostility toward its immediate victims, potentially representing an assault on the community itself.

Terrorists have historically selected targets for their symbolic significance. Government buildings represent political authority, religious institutions represent faith and identity, and public transportation systems represent the ordinary routines of civic life. Schools occupy an equally important position in American society, making their deliberate selection potentially significant beyond the number of casualties inflicted. An individual who attacks a school specifically to frighten the surrounding community may be using violence as a form of communication, even without issuing a political manifesto. The question then becomes whether that communication should be recognized as terrorism or whether the classification should be reserved for violence connected to identifiable ideological objectives. The answer depends not simply on the nature of the target, but on the evidence concerning why the perpetrator selected it.

The Terror That Remains After the Shooting

Perhaps the strongest argument for examining school shootings through the lens of terrorism concerns their consequences beyond the immediate victims. Terrorism is not simply an exercise in killing people; it involves using violence to influence the behavior, perceptions, or decisions of a wider audience. Those physically attacked are frequently only a portion of the intended audience. School shootings likewise produce consequences that extend far beyond the crime scene. Parents question whether their children are safe in classrooms, students rehearse procedures for responding to armed intruders, teachers confront responsibilities involving personal survival and the protection of children, and school districts invest in security measures that alter the educational environment. These responses may be necessary precautions, but they also demonstrate how a single violent incident can reshape ordinary behavior.

The psychological consequences are measurable. A 2021 study published in JAMA Network Open examined concerns about school violence among 2,263 adolescents attending Los Angeles-area high schools. Researchers found that greater concern about school shootings and related violence was associated with increased odds of generalized anxiety and panic symptoms six months later. Another study, published in the American Journal of Public Health in 2023, examined data from more than 211,000 adolescents and found that exposure to a high school shooting was associated with 20 percent greater odds of avoiding school because students felt unsafe. These findings provide empirical evidence that concerns about school violence and exposure to shootings are associated with measurable psychological symptoms and changes in behavior, although the observational nature of the research does not establish that every reported symptom or behavioral change was caused directly by a particular shooting.

The consequences can also persist for years. Research by Marika Cabral and colleagues, published in The Review of Economic Studies, examined educational and economic outcomes following school shootings in Texas. The researchers found increased absenteeism and grade repetition, reduced educational attainment, and lower employment and earnings among affected students in early adulthood. In other words, the consequences of school shootings extend well beyond the moment of violence, potentially influencing educational development, psychological well-being, and future economic opportunity. From the perspective of victims and communities, the distinction between terror produced by ideological violence and terror produced by other forms of mass violence may offer little consolation. The damage to individuals and institutions is not necessarily diminished because the perpetrator lacked a political or religious objective.

Nevertheless, the legal distinction remains important. Criminal law has traditionally treated intent as a critical element of responsibility, and two individuals may cause similar harm while committing legally distinct offenses because their objectives differ. Abandoning that principle merely because the consequences are horrific would create significant problems in applying terrorism statutes consistently. The challenge, therefore, is not to erase the distinction between mass murder and terrorism, but to determine whether investigators and policymakers sometimes apply that distinction too narrowly. In particular, it is worth questioning whether the search for an identifiable ideology occasionally overshadows evidence that the perpetrator deliberately intended to intimidate a much wider civilian population.

The United States Secret Service's 2019 report, Protecting America's Schools, offers a useful perspective. Examining 41 incidents of targeted school violence between 2008 and 2017, researchers identified concerning behaviors, grievances, threatening communications, and opportunities for intervention. The study was not limited to mass shootings and included attacks involving weapons other than firearms, but its findings offer broader insight into targeted violence within educational environments. The report emphasized the value of behavioral threat assessment rather than reliance on any single offender profile. That approach suggests a practical path forward: Investigators should examine not only whom an attacker intended to kill, but also whom the attacker intended to frighten, influence, punish, or intimidate. The presence or absence of a formal ideology should inform that inquiry without automatically ending it.

Ultimately, the American school shooting paradox is not that every mass murderer should be called a terrorist. Rather, it is that our understanding of terrorism may sometimes focus so narrowly on ideological motivation that we fail to fully examine violence deliberately intended to terrorize a civilian population. Indeed, the existing federal definition may already accommodate a broader examination of certain school shootings than conventional investigative classifications suggest. The issue is not necessarily whether terrorism laws must be expanded, but whether the intentions of perpetrators are being examined with sufficient attention to the possibility of deliberate civilian intimidation. A perpetrator who kills schoolchildren for personal revenge may be a mass murderer without being a terrorist, while another who attacks those same children expressly to intimidate an entire community may satisfy the broader definition of domestic terrorism, even without a conventional political or religious cause.

There is an understandable reluctance to expand the use of the term terrorism, particularly when doing so risks confusing moral outrage with legal analysis. Yet there is an equally legitimate concern that an overly restrictive interpretation can obscure the nature of violence intended to spread fear far beyond its immediate victims. The distinction should rest on evidence of the perpetrator's purpose, not simply on the presence of a manifesto, affiliation with an extremist organization, or adherence to a familiar ideological doctrine. When children become targets, communities become frightened, and ordinary life is transformed by the threat of violence, investigators should be willing to examine whether the act was intended to accomplish something more than the immediate murders.

The American school shooting paradox ultimately rests on the difference between experiencing terror and intending to create it. The fact that a shooting terrifies a community does not automatically make the perpetrator a terrorist, and the law is justified in requiring evidence of intent rather than relying solely on the magnitude of public fear. Yet when that evidence demonstrates a deliberate objective to intimidate a civilian population, the absence of a conventional ideological motive should not automatically settle the question against a terrorism classification. Americans have ample evidence that school shootings create fear, disrupt communities, and leave consequences that can persist for generations. What deserves closer examination is whether, in some of these attacks, those consequences were not merely foreseeable byproducts of mass murder but precisely what the perpetrator intended to accomplish. If that intention can be established, the designation of terrorism warrants serious consideration.


References

  1. United States Code. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5). “Definitions.” Federal statutory definition of domestic terrorism.

  2. United States Code. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). “Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries.” Federal statutory definition of a federal crime of terrorism.

  3. Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security. (2020). Domestic Terrorism: Definitions, Terminology, and Methodology. Federal report on domestic terrorism definitions and incident classification.

  4. Hunter, L. Y., Ginn, M. H., Storyllewellyn, S., & Rutland, J. (2021). “Are Mass Shootings Acts of Terror? Applying Key Criteria in Definitions of Terrorism to Mass Shootings in the United States from 1982 to 2018.” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 13(4), 265–294. DOI: 10.1080/19434472.2020.1762108.

  5. Capellan, J. A., Johnson, J., Porter, J. R., & Martin, C. (2019). “Disaggregating Mass Public Shootings: A Comparative Analysis of Disgruntled Employee, School, Ideologically Motivated, and Rampage Shooters.” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 64(3), 814–823. DOI: 10.1111/1556-4029.13985.

  6. Muschert, G. W. (2007). “Research in School Shootings.” Sociology Compass, 1(1), 60–80. DOI: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00008.x.

  7. Riehm, K. E., et al. (2021). “Adolescents' Concerns About School Violence or Shootings and Association With Depressive, Anxiety, and Panic Symptoms.” JAMA Network Open, 4(11), e2132131. DOI: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2021.32131.

  8. Hodges, J. C., Walker, D. T., Baum, C. F., & Hawkins, S. S. (2023). “Impact of School Shootings on Adolescent School Safety, 2009–2019.” American Journal of Public Health, 113(4), 438–441. DOI: 10.2105/AJPH.2022.307206.

  9. Cabral, M., Kim, B., Rossin-Slater, M., Schnell, M., & Schwandt, H. (2026). “Trauma at School: The Impacts of Shootings on Students' Human Capital and Economic Outcomes.” The Review of Economic Studies, 93(1), 327–365. DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaf027.

  10. United States Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center. (2019). Protecting America's Schools: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Targeted School Violence. U.S. Department of Homeland Security.


Monday, October 19, 2026

Department of War and BAE Systems Sign Framework Agreement to Surge Counter-Drone Production to 25,000 Precision Interceptors Annually

The Department of War announced today that it has reached a framework agreement with BAE Systems to ramp up production of the combat-proven Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS). The multi-year agreement outlines the procurement of up to 25,000 APKWS guidance sections annually for up to seven years, pending congressional authorization and appropriations.

"The Arsenal of Freedom exists for one purpose: to guarantee our warfighters decisive advantage on the battlefield," said Michael P. Duffey, Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment. "By securing multi-year demand, this agreement keeps production lines running at capacity, provides our forces with interceptor inventory, and flips the cost calculus in the taxpayer's favor."

The agreement locks production over previous contracts, establishing the sustained demand signal BAE Systems needs to procure long-lead items and expand its skilled workforce. APKWS delivers a combat-proven, high-lethality interceptor while countering widespread aerial threats.

Beyond the baseline of 25,000 units per year, the framework establishes an actionable pathway to surge output up to 35,000 units annually for international allies. This industrial expansion will be unlocked as partner nations formalize orders via Foreign Military Sales Letters of Request.

By leveraging allied demand to capitalize new domestic production lines, the Department strengthens the nation's industrial base. Each active line directly expands sovereign U.S. surge capacity, preserving warm, high-rate manufacturing infrastructure ready to respond on short notice.

The agreement was finalized in partnership across the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

Friday, October 16, 2026

DOT, DoW, DHS Join Forces to Protect Southern Border Airspace

Temporary flight restriction will prohibit unauthorized drone operations within one nautical mile of the U.S.-Mexico border, from the surface to 400 feet

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of War (DoW) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) today announced a new, coordinated effort to strengthen airspace security along the southern U.S. border through a temporary flight restriction (TFR) for drones. The TFR — effective today — will bar any unauthorized drone activity up to 400 feet above ground level and extend one nautical mile north of the U.S.-Mexico border.

The move builds on the Trump Administration's successful efforts to secure the southern border and defend the homeland from national security threats — including illicit cartel activity. The new measure will reduce risks to ongoing border security operations, protect federal personnel, facilities and the Homeland, and enhance enforcement against those who violate the restrictions.

"President Trump promised to secure the Southern Border, and he did. Now we're doubling down on that promise by protecting our skies from cartel drone threats and other illicit activities," said U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy. "I appreciate the close collaboration with our partners at DHS and DoW as we work together to defend our airspace and keep the American people safe."

"The United States government will maintain 100% operational control of our border: land, air, and sea," said Secretary of War Pete Hegseth. "For too long, cartels have taken advantage of gaps along our southern border. Thanks to President Donald J. Trump, those days are over. By restricting unauthorized drone activity, we are giving commanders greater awareness, greater decision space, and more options to defend the Homeland. Equipped with cutting-edge technology — including Directed Energy Weapons — our warfighters will shoot down any cartel drone that threatens America's sovereignty."

"DHS will not stop building on the historic progress made to secure the southern border," said Secretary of Homeland Security Markwayne Mullin. "This action will help counter cartel drone threats, protect our personnel, and strengthen security in the airspace above the border. President Trump promised to secure the border, and we are delivering on that promise through continued action and strong partnership with Department of Transportation and the Department of War."

Additional Information:

The FAA will publish a NOTAM which will include links to the Domestic Notice and the FAA's UAS Data Delivery System.

Drone operators are responsible for reviewing all applicable NOTAMs and restrictions before operating and must comply with the requirements in effect for their planned operations.

Tuesday, October 13, 2026

Centcom Forces Disable Cargo Vessel Attempting to Violate Blockade

Service members operating in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility disabled a commercial cargo vessel in the Gulf of Oman Oct. 10, after the ship's crew ignored repeated warnings and attempted to run the ongoing naval blockade against Iran. 

A U.S. military fighter jet struck the stern of the Panama-flagged M/V Ocean Molica with a precision munition, fully crippling the ship's propulsion without harming the crew. The large cargo vessel was attempting to transit regional waters after departing an Iranian port. 

The Centcom forces resumed America's blockade of all ships entering or departing Iranian ports. During three months of strict enforcement, four commercial vessels have been disabled, and 135 ships have been turned around. Additionally, U.S. forces have destroyed 10 tankers linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' multibillion-dollar shadow network over the same period. 

All mariners are advised to heed blockade warnings from Centcom forces. Crews should also continue to monitor Notice to Mariners broadcasts and contact U.S. naval forces on bridge-to-bridge channel 16 when operating in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz approaches.

Friday, October 02, 2026

Department of War Accelerates Counter-UAS Employment to Defend American Airspace Sovereignty

The Department of War today issued a memorandum to accelerate the lawful, safe, and effective employment of counter-unmanned aircraft systems (c-UAS) across the Department.

The memorandum, Accelerating Employment of Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems to Protect American Airspace Sovereignty, directs the Department of War to eliminate unnecessary barriers that delay c-UAS capabilities for forces, installations, and assets.

The policy requires approval authorities to treat delays as an operational risk; use relevant prior approvals, test data and risk mitigations to accelerate comparable decisions; and use interim, conditional, or time-bound approvals when testing supports low or manageable risk.

Any denial of requested c-UAS employment must be documented with a rationale and submitted to Joint Interagency Task Force-401 (JIATF-401). Every approval barrier must have a designated owner, timeline, and escalation path. If an approval authority does not act within 30 days, the requestor will notify the office of the Secretary of War.

The memorandum targets four barriers that have delayed fielding of c-UAS capabilities:

  • Authorities to operate: Within 30 days, the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer, working with the DoW Chief Information Officer (CIO) and other Department organizations, will establish a single Department-wide c-UAS process to reduce approval timelines for tested and validated systems from months to days or weeks.
  • Spectrum certification and frequency: The CIO will review the c-UAS spectrum-request process and recommend ways to accelerate approvals. The Department will support the Defense Innovation Unit’s Project Spectrum Strike, an automated, AI‑driven software to coordinate, authorize, and deconflict U.S. government radio spectrum use to incorporate c-UAS spectrum-management requirements.
  • Weapons safety: Services will not repeat a weapons safety review for the same system, configuration and use case unless a material change creates a new risk. JIATF-401 will synchronize c-UAS weapons safety reviews with the Unmanned Systems Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager.
  • Legal reviews: Required reviews for c-UAS weapons and weapon systems will be expedited, generally within 10 days after receipt of necessary information. Components will share completed reviews to support timely, consistent decisions.

The memorandum does not change existing policies or procedures governing operational c-UAS use, including activities under 10 U.S.C. § 130i, and does not authorize violations of law or compromises to public or Service member safety.

To read the full memorandum, click here.

Wednesday, September 30, 2026

Statement by Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell on the Conclusion of the U.S. Military Mission in Iraq

Today, the United States and our Coalition partners formally concluded Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq, consistent with the September 2024 U.S.-Iraq joint statement and U.S. national interests.

The orderly departure of Coalition forces and equipment from Erbil Air Base marks the successful conclusion of the military mission that defeated ISIS in Iraq.

This milestone reflects the success of a 12-year campaign that defeated ISIS as an organized military threat in Iraq and across the region. It also marks a transition from a wartime coalition mission to an Iraqi-led security effort supported by a more normal bilateral security relationship. 

We expect the Iraqi Security Forces, including the Peshmerga and other security forces in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, to lead the continuing effort to secure Iraq and keep ISIS remnants suppressed. The Department of War will continue to provide targeted training and intelligence support to our Iraqi partners.

The primary responsibility for addressing Iraq's remaining security challenges, including ISIS remnants and Iran-aligned militias that undermine Iraqi sovereignty and regional stability, now rests with the Government of Iraq. The United States remains committed to counterterrorism and will continue to work with Iraq and our partners to ensure ISIS can never reconstitute from Iraqi territory.

The United States supports a strong sovereign Iraq that secures its borders, protects its people, and serves as the foundation for deeper commercial, diplomatic, and security cooperation between our two countries.

Friday, September 25, 2026

Media Invitation Announced for United States v. Khalid Shaikh Mohammad et al. Pre-Trial Hearing

The Department of War invites media to cover pre-trial proceedings in the case of United States v. Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarek Bin 'Attash, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi, scheduled for December 7 - 18, 2026. The defendants are charged in connection with their alleged roles in the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States.

The proceedings will be conducted at the Expeditionary Legal Complex located in Naval Station Guantanamo Bay (NSGB) Cuba and will be transmitted to a closed-circuit television site at Ft. Meade, Md.

Media choosing to travel to NSGB will pay round-trip airfare ($800); coverage window is determined by flight schedule. Specific ground rules for coverage at NSGB will follow registration.

The primary purpose of this invitation is to cover the military commissions. Tours of the detention facilities are not available. Requests for reporting on Guantanamo Bay topics unrelated to the military commissions — such as the naval base facilities or personnel — must be coordinated in advance.

Coverage windows, including travel days:

  • December 5 – 12
  • December 12 -19

Registration: Click here for registration. Please select the "Khalid Shaikh Mohammad et al" case from the drop-down selection on the registration form. Enter the specific dates requested as outlined above.

Deadline: All requests must be received no later than Friday, October 2. Additional details of travel logistics will be provided separately. By submitting the online request form, interested media will begin the travel process, and the Office of Military Commissions (OMC) will contact the media to assist in travel preparation.

CCTV Site: Media desiring to view this hearing from the media-designated viewing site at Fort Meade, Md., must send requests via email to osd.mc-alex.OMC.mbx.omc-pa@mail.mil with e-mail subject line matching the court case and the following information: name, position, news organization and contact information.

Contact Mr. Ron Flesvig, OMC Public Affairs, for additional questions at ronald.flesvig2.civ@mail.mil or (571) 372-3713.

Case information can be viewed at the Office of Military Commissions website: https://www.mc.mil