Iran’s Tactical Pivot: The Future of Proxy Terror

The escalating conflict between Israel and Iran marks a turning point in Tehran’s geopolitical strategy. Faced with military setbacks and regional pressure, Iran appears to be shifting from overt proxy warfare to a more covert, asymmetric approach. This essay explores Iran’s tactical pivot, outlining emerging trends and the implications of a recalibrated proxy terrorism posture.

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I. Contextual Overview: From Public Proxy Engagement to Covert Tactics

For decades, Iran has relied on the so-called “Axis of Resistance”—a network of proxy groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias, and Yemen’s Houthis. These groups enabled Iran to exert influence while avoiding direct military confrontation with Israel or the West (Financial Times, 2025; WSJ, 2025). However, recent Israeli offensives have significantly weakened these proxies: Hezbollah sidelined post-2024 conflict, Hamas depleted, Iraqi militias cautious, and the Houthis largely inactive (WSJ, 2025; The Washington Post, 2025; AP News, 2025). These declining capabilities position Iran at a strategic crossroads, spurring a shift toward more deniable, unconventional instruments of asymmetrical warfare.

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II. Trend 1: Activation of Sleeper Cells Abroad

With its overt proxies neutralized, Iran’s leadership—especially the IRGC and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—may resort to pre-positioned sleeper cells in the West. These cells could be tasked with sabotage, targeted assassinations, or bomb plots in Europe and North America (NY Post, 2025; CSIS, 2024). Historically, Iran has pursued such operations, though agent effectiveness varied (West Point CTC, 2022). In today’s climate of heightened vigilance, sleeper networks may become a strategic fallback for Iran to signal capability and resolve without incurring full-scale military retaliation.

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III. Trend 2: Covert Targeted Assassinations

Iran’s longstanding use of targeted killings as a foreign-policy tool is set to intensify. These covert operations allow Iran to advance political objectives while retaining strategic ambiguity and plausible deniability (West Point CTC, 2022). Given recent Israeli strikes undermining Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure—and key personnel like IRGC commanders—retaliatory assassinations abroad are increasingly probable (Foreign Policy, 2025). European cities with large Jewish or Israeli diasporas may be primary targets, mirroring past attempts against dissidents and regime critics.

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IV. Trend 3: Cyber-Enabled Terrorism

Digital warfare is evolving into a primary vector of asymmetric conflict. Recently, the Israel-linked group Predatory Sparrow conducted cyberattacks against Iran’s financial and infrastructure systems, including Nobitex and Sepah Bank, destroying over $90 million in cryptocurrency and disrupting civilian access (Wired, 2025; The Guardian, 2025; TechCrunch, 2025). Revenge cyber campaigns by Iran or IRGC-aligned actors targeting Israeli and Western networks—critical infrastructure, communications, government systems, or financial sectors—are increasingly likely. Such acts blend terror tactics with state-backed cyber strategy, heightening the risk to civilian systems.

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V. Trend 4: Hybrid and Proxy Resurgence with Lower-Intensity Tactics

Although severely weakened, Iran’s regional proxies may execute hybrid-style, low-intensity attacks while avoiding direct confrontation. This could include IEDs, precision drone strikes, small-scale guerrilla actions, and maritime harassment via the Houthis in strategic zones like the Red Sea (Wikipedia, 2025; CFR, 2025). Iran may deploy such tactics to signal its presence and influence without provoking decisive military retaliation, especially if fully re-integrating these proxies proves infeasible.

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VI. Trend 5: Transnational Terrorism as Political Leverage

With regionally-based proxies out of action, Iran may revive transnational terror capabilities to project global influence. This involves drawing on proxy networks and sleeper cells to threaten or attack Israeli, Jewish, or Western targets in regions from Europe to South America (Congress.gov, 2015). Transnational terrorism would serve dual purposes: weighing on adversary governments and signaling Iran’s retaliatory capacity, even amid regional attrition.

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VII. Trend 6: Intelligence and Espionage Operations

In parallel with terrorist tactics, Iran is ramping up intelligence operations targeting military and civilian targets. The discovery of clandestine Mossad drone bases and deep Israeli strikes in Iran underscores the shift to integrated espionage and sabotage (Wikipedia, 2025). Iran is likely to mirror this by enhancing IRGC-Quds Force intelligence across adversary networks, embedding operatives and informants. These efforts will support terror activities and provide strategic advantage in cyber and kinetic domains.

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VIII. Implications for International Security

Iran’s pivot toward asymmetrical proxy tactics carries significant risks:

1. Elevated threat to Western cities: Covert terrorism and sleeper-cell activation raise the probability of attacks in democratic nations.

2. Cyber-physical integration: Terrorism may now combine cyber sabotage with physical violence to maximize impact.

3. Ambiguity and deniability: Low-intensity hybrid tactics and covert operations complicate attribution and response.

4. Escalation control: Iran’s strategic use of non-state proxies allows tit-for-tat retaliation without triggering state-level war.

5. Strained geopolitical balance: The erosion of Iran’s conventional deterrents increases room for proxy miscalculations.

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IX. Transportation and Global Economic Impact

Proxy warfare via maritime and infrastructure threats—particularly in the Red Sea—could disrupt global trade. The Houthis have previously attacked over 100 vessels, forcing rerouting and hitting the Bab al-Mandab chokepoint (Wikipedia, 2025). Should Iran amplify such actions as leverage, disruptions to critical sea lanes could ensue, with major economic impacts.

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X. Strategic and Policy Recommendations

To counter Iran’s emerging tactics, a layered security approach should be pursued:

• Enhanced intelligence-sharing: Cooperative signals, cyber, and HUMINT exchange among Western and Middle Eastern agencies.

• Counter-sleeper monitoring: Elevated surveillance and legal frameworks in diaspora communities.

• Cyber defense hardening: Public/private collaboration to protect financial and critical infrastructure.

• Port and maritime security: Resilient defense in chokepoints through allied naval cooperation and convoy arrangements.

• Diplomatic deterrence: Coordinated sanctions, legal actions, and political messaging to raise the costs of covert aggression.

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Conclusion

Michel Foucault once noted that power structures “work in secrecy and in complete darkness.” Today, in the wake of direct military pressures, Iran is turning toward the shadowy realms of asymmetric conflict—cyber sabotage, covert terror, and hybrid proxy warfare. This strategic pivot reflects diminished regional capacity but signals a more dangerous international posture. As proxies remain fractured and weaker, Iran will rely on the stealth of subterranean networks to project influence—altering the global threat landscape. To adapt, the international community must rise to the challenge: fostering resilience, interoperability, and vigilance against today’s less visible — yet perhaps more insidious — threat paradigm.

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References

AP News. (2025, June 14). Why are some key Tehran allies staying out of the Israel‑Iran conflict? Associated Press. Retrieved from AP News archive.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2024). Escalating to war between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran. CSIS Analysis.

Congressionally-mandated hearings. (2015). Iran and Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere. Congress.gov.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2025). Iran’s support for the Houthis. CFR. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org

Foreign Policy. (2025, June 13). Iran’s options for retaliating against Israel have narrowed.

TechCrunch. (2025, June 18). Hackers steal and destroy millions from Iran’s largest crypto exchange.

The Guardian. (2025, June 18). Israel‑linked group hacks Iranian cryptocurrency exchange in $90m heist.

Wired. (2025, June 18). Israel‑tied Predatory Sparrow hackers are waging cyberwar on Iran’s financial system.

West Point CTC. (2022). Trends in Iranian external assassination, surveillance, and abduction plots. Combating Terrorism Center.

Wikipedia. (2025). Red Sea crisis; Iranian support for the Houthis; June 2025 Mossad operations in Iran.

The al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB): A Closer Look at Their Origins, Operations, and Regional Impact

The al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB) is a militant group that has gained attention for its activities in the Middle East, particularly in Bahrain. This article provides an in-depth analysis of the AAB, shedding light on its origins, operations, and the regional impact it has had on security and stability.

Origins and Ideology: 

The al-Ashtar Brigades emerged in the early 2010s in Bahrain, a small island nation in the Persian Gulf. The group advocates for the overthrow of the Bahraini monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic state. They draw inspiration from Shiite ideologies and have been associated with Iran, although the extent of their ties remains a matter of debate. The AAB has been labeled as a terrorist organization by Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Operational Activities: 

The AAB has been involved in various acts of violence, including bombings, armed attacks, and assassinations. They primarily target security forces, government institutions, and infrastructure. The group's operations often aim to destabilize the Bahraini government and create fear within the population. While the AAB's activities have been concentrated in Bahrain, there have been reports of their involvement in neighboring countries as well.

Regional Impact and Challenges: 

The activities of the al-Ashtar Brigades have had a significant impact on regional security, particularly in Bahrain. The group's attacks have resulted in casualties and posed challenges to the stability of the country. The Bahraini government has faced difficulties in countering the AAB's operations due to the group's covert nature and its ability to recruit and mobilize sympathizers. The ongoing tensions between Bahrain's Shiite majority and Sunni-led government also contribute to the complexity of the situation.

Connections and External Support: 

The AAB has faced allegations of receiving support from external actors, particularly Iran. Bahrain and its allies have accused Iran of providing training, weapons, and financial assistance to the group. Iran has denied these claims, although there is evidence suggesting some level of coordination and support between the AAB and Iran-backed elements. The external support received by the AAB has allowed them to enhance their capabilities and expand their influence.

Counterterrorism Efforts and Future Outlook: 

The Bahraini government, supported by its regional allies, has implemented counterterrorism measures to combat the AAB. These efforts include intelligence operations, arrests, and crackdowns on suspected AAB members. However, eliminating the AAB and addressing the underlying grievances that contribute to their support base remain significant challenges. The group's resilience and ability to adapt to security measures indicate that the AAB will likely continue to pose a threat in the future.

International Response and Human Rights Concerns: 

The activities of the AAB have drawn international attention and raised concerns regarding human rights violations. Some international organizations have criticized the Bahraini government's approach to counterterrorism, citing instances of arbitrary arrests, torture, and repression of dissent. Balancing effective counterterrorism measures with respect for human rights and addressing legitimate grievances is a complex task that requires careful consideration and cooperation among stakeholders.

Conclusion: 

The al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB) represent a significant security challenge in Bahrain and the broader Middle East region. Understanding the origins, operations, and regional impact of the AAB is crucial for developing comprehensive and effective counterterrorism strategies. Addressing the underlying political and social issues, promoting dialogue and reconciliation, and addressing grievances are essential steps in mitigating the threat posed by the AAB and fostering long-term stability and security in the region.

Panetta: Iran Increases Support to Assad Regime

By Nick Simeone

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Aug. 14, 2012 – Iran is increasing its presence in Syria, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta said today, through apparent efforts to bolster the Bashar Assad regime by training a militia and other tactics.

“There’s now indications that they’re trying to develop or trying to train a militia within Syria to be able to fight on behalf of the regime,” Panetta said at a Pentagon news briefing. “So we are seeing a growing presence by Iran and that is of deep concern to us.”

The secretary said he hopes Iran thinks again about how much it wants to get involved in Syria. “The Syrian people ought to determine their future, not Iran,” he said.

Iran’s interference is adding to the killing in Syria, Panetta said, and “tries to bolster a regime that we think, ultimately, is going to come down.”

The secretary noted the increasing number of defections and problems within the Syrian military as further signs of collapse. Assad’s former prime minister, Riyad Farid Hijab, fled the country last week and a number of key generals have defected in recent months, as well.

Speaking alongside Panetta at the briefing, Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the 18-month uprising is taking an obvious toll on the Syrian army.

“I actually think that’s why Iran is stepping in to form this militia, to take some of the pressure off of the Syrian military,” Dempsey said.

The fighting, Dempsey said, has left pro-Assad forces with resupply and morale problems. “Any army would be taxed with that kind of pace,” he said.

Panetta said U.S. efforts to end Assad’s rule are being worked primarily through diplomatic channels, with a focus on ensuring the security of Syria’s chemical and biological weapons as well as providing humanitarian aid to refugees and non-lethal aid to the opposition.

The Defense Department plans for “a number of contingencies,” Panetta said, but any notion of establishing a no-fly zone over Syria, as some rebels have called for, is “not a front-burner issue for us.”

Still, he said, “we are prepared to be able to respond to whatever the president of the United States asks us to do.”

Mariners Head Home Following Rescue At Sea

From Enterprise Carrier Strike Group Public Affairs

USS ENTERPRISE, At Sea (NNS) -- Ten mariners were transferred Aug. 10 to the Iranian navy for repatriation following a rescue at-sea.

Guided-missile destroyer USS James E. Williams (DDG 95) rescued the men from their burning vessel in the Gulf of Oman, Aug 8.

The vessel was flying an Iranian flag. The mariners - who claim to be Iranian - were well cared for and received medical treatment aboard James E. Williams. They were transported to aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVN 65), where they received further medical treatment before being transported back  to James E. Williams while awaiting repatriation efforts.

James E. Williams is currently deployed as part of the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility conducting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts.

USS James E. Williams Transfers Rescued Mariners to Iranian Vessel

By Enterprise Carrier Strike Group Public Affairs

USS JAMES E. WILLIAMS, At Sea (NNS) -- USS JAMES E. WILLIAMS, At Sea - Guided-missile destroyer USS James E. Williams transferred 10 Iranian mariners rescued from a burning dhow Aug. 8 to an Iranian vessel in the Gulf of Oman Aug. 10.

Members of Williams' visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) team transferred the mariners from the destroyer to an Iranian-flagged dhow for repatriation.

Williams (DDG 95) rescued the 10 mariners in the Gulf of Oman after they were forced to abandon their burning vessel.

Following the rescue, the mariners were taken to Williams, where they received initial medical treatment for injuries sustained during the fire and subsequent evacuation.

They were then transported to aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVN 65) for further medical treatment before being returned to Williams for today's repatriation.

The cause of the fire is under investigation.

James E. Williams is currently deployed as part of the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility conducting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts.

For further questions, please contact U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs Office.

 Phone: 011-973-1785-4027 or E-mail: navcentpao@me.navy.mil>

Little: Middle East Minesweeping Exercise Set for September

By Army Sgt. 1st Class Tyrone C. Marshall Jr.

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, July 17, 2012 – A multinational minesweeping exercise scheduled for this fall in the waters of the Middle East is intended to increase U.S. capabilities and cooperation with allies, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little told reporters today.

“This is not an exercise aimed to deliver a message to Iran,” Little said in answer to questions about the reported maneuvers.

Rather, “It’s an international symposium and exercise of mine countermeasures conducted in multiple locations in the [U.S. Naval Forces Central Command] area of operations,” he added.  “This is a defensive exercise aimed at preserving freedom of navigation in the international waterways of the Middle East and aimed at promoting regional stability in the [U.S. Central Command] area of responsibility.”

According to Centcom, the International Mines Countermeasures Exercise, scheduled to run from Sept. 16 through Sept. 27, will include more than 20 nations across four continents.

Scenarios will focus on a hypothetical threat from an extremist organization mining the international strategic waterways of the Middle East, Centcom said in a statement.

Additionally, there will be scenario-based exercises held in the Persian Gulf, but they will not extend to the Strait of Hormuz near Iran, Centcom officials said. Exercises will take place in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Oman.

Little noted this will be an important exercise involving an international contingent of military planners.

“These exercises are designed to enhance cooperation, develop a mutual maritime capability and aimed at promoting long-term regional stability,” he said.

2 indicted after HSI investigation for alleged efforts to supply Iran with US materials for gas centrifuges to enrich uranium

Accused Iranian procurement agent arrested in the Philippines

WASHINGTON — A federal grand jury in the District of Columbia has returned a superseding indictment charging Parviz Khaki, a citizen of Iran, and Zongcheng Yi, a resident of China, for their alleged efforts to obtain and illegally export to Iran U.S.-origin materials that can be used to construct, operate and maintain gas centrifuges to enrich uranium, including maraging steel, aluminum alloys, mass spectrometers, vacuum pumps and other items. Khaki is also accused of conspiring to procure radioactive source materials from the United States for customers in Iran. The indictment is the result of an extensive investigation by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).

The superseding indictment, which was returned late yesterday, was announced by ICE Director John Morton; Assistant Attorney General for National Security Lisa Monaco; and U.S. Attorney Ronald C. Machen Jr., District of Columbia.

The superseding indictment charges Khaki, age 43, aka Martin, and Yi, aka Yi Cheng, aka Kohler, aka Kohler Yi, each with one count of conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by conspiring with others to cause the export of U.S. goods to Iran without the required U.S. Treasury Department license. Both defendants are also charged with one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States; two counts of smuggling; two counts of illegally exporting U.S. goods to Iran in violation of IEEPA; and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering.

Khaki was arrested May 24, 2012, by authorities in the Philippines in connection with a U.S. provisional arrest request stemming from a March 8, 2012 indictment in the District of Columbia. Yi, who is purported to be the managing director of Monalila Co. LTD, a company in Guangzhou City, China, remains at large.

Both defendants face a maximum potential sentence of 20 years in prison for conspiring to violate IEEPA; five years in prison for conspiring to defraud the United States; ten years in prison for each smuggling count; 20 years in prison for each IEEPA count and 20 years in prison for conspiracy to commit money laundering.

"By dismantling this complex conspiracy to deliver nuclear-related materials from the United States to Iran, we have disrupted a significant threat to national security," said ICE Director Morton. "Homeland Security Investigations will continue to pursue those who exploit U.S. businesses to illegally supply foreign governments with sensitive materials and technology that pose a serious risk to America and its allies."

"Today's indictment sheds light on the reach of Iran's illegal procurement networks and the importance of keeping U.S. nuclear-related materials from being exploited by Iran. Iranian procurement networks continue to target U.S. and Western companies for technology acquisition by using fraud, front companies and middlemen in nations around the globe. I applaud the authorities in the Philippines and the many U.S. agents, analysts and prosecutors who worked on this important case," said Assistant Attorney General Monaco.

"This new indictment shows that we have no tolerance for those who try to traffic in commodities that can be used to support Iran's nuclear program," said U.S. Attorney Machen. "It also underscores our commitment to aggressively enforcing export laws."

According to the indictment, from around October 2008 through January 2011, Khaki, Yi and others conspired to cause the export of goods from the United States to Iran in violation of the embargo. At no time during this period did the defendants have a license or authorization from the Treasury Department to export any U.S. goods to Iran.

In carrying out the conspiracy, the indictment alleges that Khaki directed Yi and others to contact U.S. companies about purchasing U.S.-origin goods. Yi and other conspirators then placed orders and purchased goods from various U.S. companies and had the goods exported from the United States through China and Hong Kong to Khaki and others in Iran. Yi and others allegedly made a variety of false statements to U.S. companies on behalf of Khaki to conceal that Iran was the final destination and end-user of the goods and to convince U.S. companies to export these items to a third country.

Efforts to Export to Iran U.S. Materials for Gas Centrifuges to Enrich Uranium

For example, the indictment alleges that Dec. 6, 2008, Khaki asked an individual in China to obtain 20 tons of C-350 maraging steel from the United States for Khaki's customer in Iran. In the months that followed, Khaki also had communications with Yi about purchasing 20 tons of maraging steel from a U.S. company with which Yi was in contact. Maraging steel is a special class of high-strength steel known for possessing superior strength without losing malleability. The enhanced strength of maraging steel makes it particularly suited for use in gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment.

In March 2009, Khaki allegedly began communicating with an undercover U.S. federal agent posing as an illegal exporter of U.S. goods. The agent told Khaki that the U.S. company (referenced above) could not sell Khaki the maraging steel because doing so was illegal, but that he (the undercover agent) could potentially help export the steel for a fee. Khaki allegedly replied to the agent with questions about price and payment. In the months that followed, Khaki continued to communicate with the agent in an effort to acquire and export the maraging steel to Iran, noting in one instance, "you know and I know this material are [sic] limited material and danger goods..." Khaki also discussed his desire to make money from the transaction.

The indictment also alleges that in late 2008, Khaki reached out to an individual in China about procuring 20 tons of 7075-O aluminum alloy 80mm rods and 20 tons of 7075-T6 aluminum alloy 150 mm rods from the United States or Europe. In one communication, Khaki explained to the individual that the aluminum alloy had to be American made because his Iranian customer had previously found that Chinese aluminum alloy was of poor quality.

Khaki also allegedly sought to obtain mass spectrometers from the United States. In a May 2009 email request to the undercover federal agent, Khaki specified that one magnetic mass spectrometer he sought was for the isotopic analysis of gaseous uranium hexafluoride. Uranium hexafluoride is the chemical compound used in the gas centrifuge process to enrich uranium. Khaki and Yi also conspired to obtain other items from U.S. companies that can be used for gas centrifuges, including measuring instruments, pressure transducers, vacuum pumps and other accessories, according to the charges.

Efforts to Export to Iran Radioactive Materials

The indictment further alleges that Khaki sought to obtain radioactive source materials from the United States. In May 2009, for instance, Khaki sent an email to the undercover agent asking the agent to purchase radioactive sources and test materials from a U.S. company. Attached to the email was a list of products, including barium-133 source and europium-152 source, as well as contact information for the U.S. company.

In January 2011, Khaki contacted the undercover agent again requesting that he purchase various radioactive sources. In one email to the agent, Khaki allegedly sent a product catalogue for radioactive sources, including cobalt-57 source, and in another email he requested the agent purchase cadmium-109 source.

Exports to Iran of Lathes and Nickel Alloy Wire through Hong Kong, China

The indictment alleges the defendants caused the illegal export of lathes and nickel alloy 120 wire from the United States through China to Iran. In February 2009, Khaki asked Yi to contact a U.S. company about procuring two Twister Speed Lathes. Yi allegedly purchased these items and arranged for them to be shipped from the United States to Hong Kong and ultimately to Iran in June 2009.

In another transaction Jan. 26, 2009, Khaki allegedly asked a conspirator to contact a U.S. company about purchasing nickel alloy 120. At Khaki's request, the conspirator sent a U.S. company an order for nickel alloy, falsely stating that a company in China was the purchaser. In June 2009, the U.S. company shipped the nickel alloy to Yi in Hong Kong, who shipped it on to Iran, according to the charges.

This investigation was conducted by HSI special agents. Assistance was provided by authorities in the Philippines. The prosecution is being handled by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorney Brandon L. Van Grack of the Counterespionage Section of the Justice Department's National Security Division. The Office of International Affairs in the Justice Department's Criminal Division also provided assistance.

The magnitude and scope of the threats facing the United States has never been greater than today. This is due in part to individuals exporting military items overseas and sending products to sanctioned or embargoed countries. This jeopardizes the safety of our soldiers, citizens and national interests. HSI aims to prevent terrorist groups and hostile nations from illegally obtaining U.S. military products and sensitive technology, including weapons of mass destruction. The Counter-Proliferation Investigations Unit, part HSI's National Security Investigations Division, oversees a broad range of investigations related to export law violations. It enforces U.S. export laws involving military items and controlled dual-use goods, as well as products going to sanctioned or embargoed countries. Learn more at www.ICE.gov/HSI.

The public is reminded that an indictment contains mere allegations. Defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty in a court of law.

Pentagon: In Syria, Iran Helps Assad, al-Qaida Foments Violence

By Cheryl Pellerin

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON – In Syria, where Bashar Assad’s government continues to massacre its population, Iran is supporting the regime and members of al-Qaida are in the country for their own purposes, Pentagon spokesman Navy Capt. John Kirby told reporters today.

“We remain deeply troubled and concerned by the ongoing violence in Syria and by the horrific acts of the Assad regime against its own people,” Kirby told reporters at a Pentagon press briefing.

“And we certainly have seen reports and have reason to believe that Iran continues to assist the Assad regime in committing these acts of atrocities against the Syrian people,” he added.

Other nations share that concern, the Pentagon spokesman said, and some are providing lethal assistance to opponents of the Syrian regime.

Kirby said defense officials have seen but cannot confirm reports that the Iranians are using commercial airliners to move arms into Syria.

“The larger issue here is that the Iranian regime, Tehran, continues to support, in tangible and intangible ways, the Assad regime,” he added, “and that needs to stop.”

At the White House, spokesman Jay Carney said the administration has been focused on the need to bring about a political transition in Syria sooner rather than later.

“The longer that Assad and his thugs are allowed to brutally murder the Syrian people, the more likely it becomes a sectarian civil war; the more likely that it spills over Syrian borders; the more likely that it transforms into a proxy war with different players,” Carney said, “including … Iran, which is already engaging in malignant behavior with regards to the Syrian situation, stepping up that kind of activity and not being alone in doing that.”

What’s happening in Syria, he added, “only underscores the urgent need to take action to prevent further devolution of the situation there, take action to support the process of political transition, to isolate and pressure Assad into taking himself out of power so that that transition can proceed.”

At the Pentagon, Kirby said defense officials believe “al-Qaida has some presence inside Syria and interest in fomenting violence in Syria.”

He added, “We do not believe they share the goals of the Syrian opposition or that they are even embraced by the opposition … The sense that we get is that it is primarily members of [al-Qaida in Iraq] that are migrating into Syria.”

Syria drew renewed world attention following a massacre May 25 of more than 100 people north of the city of Homs which international observers largely blamed on forces linked to the government.

U.S. policy on Syria is to work with international partners to put diplomatic and economic pressure on Damascus to help stem the humanitarian crisis.

The Defense Department supports the administration’s position, Kirby said, while providing options to the nation’s leaders for other potential responses.

“That's what we do and we would be irresponsible if we weren't thinking about options, whether or not they're called for, he said”

The military can be valuable in any number of scenarios, not all of which involve combat, Kirby added.

“The point is we're doing the prudent thing that we're supposed to do, which is to think through options. But we've not been called to present any,” the Pentagon spokesman said.

“These are decisions that only the policymakers can make,” Kirby said. “And again, we're supporting the commander in chief's intent, which is to keep the pressure on [the Assad regime] diplomatically and economically.”

Iran Will Be Biggest Loser When Assad Falls, Panetta Says

By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, March 7, 2012 – Iran will be the biggest loser when Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime falls, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta told the Senate Armed Services Committee today.

Panetta and Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the committee on the situation in Syria this morning.

The Syrian people want what the people of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have – a chance at freedom and a democratic future, the secretary said. Assad and his people are indiscriminately killing those pushing for peaceful change in the nation. The fighting in the country is causing a humanitarian crisis of the first order, and thousands of Syrians are fleeing from the country to Jordan, Iraq and Turkey.

A stable Syria is vital to the Middle East and the world, Panetta said. “But perhaps most notably, Syria is a pivotal country for Iran,” the secretary said. “Syria is Iran’s only state ally in the region and is crucial to Iran’s efforts to support those militants throughout the region who threaten Israel and threaten regional stability.”

The unrest in Syria already has weakened Iran’s position in the Middle East, and it will be further weakened if the regime falls, the secretary said. “As groups such as Hamas distance themselves from the Assad regime, Iran is quickly becoming the Assad regime’s lone backer,” he added. “This shows the world the hypocrisy of Tehran.”

Panetta told the senators that the United States is on the side of the Syrian people. “They must know that the international community has not underestimated either their suffering or their impatience,” he said. “We all wish there was a clear and unambiguous way forward to directly influence the events in Syria. That, unfortunately, is not the case.”

The only clear path is for the international community to act as one against the regime, the secretary said.

Dempsey told the panel that Syria’s internal convulsions are having consequences. In addition to the refugee problem, the general said, “we also need to be alert to the movement of extremists and other hostile actors seeking to exploit the situation.”

“And we need to be especially alert to the fate of Syria’s chemical and biological weapons,” the chairman added. “They must stay exactly where they are.”

The U.S. military role to date has been limited to sharing information with regional partners, Dempsey said. “But, should we be called on to help secure U.S. interests in other ways, we will be ready,” he told the senators. “We maintain an agile regional and global posture. We have solid military relationships with every country on Syria’s borders.”

And the military is prepared to provide U.S. government leaders with options, Dempsey said. “All options will be judged in terms of their suitability, their feasibility and their acceptability,” he added. “We have a further responsibility to articulate risk and the potential implications for our other global commitments.”

Panetta told the senators that unilateral U.S. action in Syria does not make sense.

“As secretary of defense, before I recommend that we put our sons and daughters in uniform in harm’s way, I’ve got to make very sure that we know what the mission is,” he said. “I’ve got to make very sure that we know whether we can achieve that mission, at what price, and whether or not it’ll make matters better or worse. Those are the considerations that I have to engage in.”

The United States needs to build the same type of coalition that worked in Libya, Dempsey said.

The senators asked Dempsey specifically about an air campaign over Syria. “We’ve demonstrated the capability to penetrate air defense systems for a discrete purpose and a very limited amount of time,” he said. “We still have that capability.” To conduct a sustained campaign, the U.S. military would have to suppress Syria’s air defense.

“In closed session, we do have an estimate based on gaming and modeling of how long it would take to do that, given the density and the sophistication of their air defense system,” Dempsey said. “But it would be an extended period of time, and a great number of aircraft.”

Such an air campaign would be led by the United States, at least initially, Dempsey said, noting that only U.S. forces have the electronic warfare capabilities to take down those defenses.

Help Us Bring Bob Levinson Home

$1 Million Reward Offered for Missing Retired FBI Agent

This week marks the fifth anniversary of Robert Levinson’s disappearance, and the FBI today announced a reward of up to $1 million for information leading to the safe recovery and return of the retired special agent.

Levinson, who retired from the FBI in 1998 after 22 years of service, was working as a private investigator when he traveled to Kish Island, Iran on March 8, 2007. He has not been seen or heard from publicly since he disappeared the following day. In 2010, a video showing him in captivity was sent to the Levinson family by his captors.

The FBI is responsible for investigating crimes committed against U.S. citizens abroad. We have been working since 2007 to obtain information about Levinson’s whereabouts and well-being.

“On the fifth anniversary of Bob’s disappearance, the FBI continues to follow every lead into his abduction and captivity,” said James W. McJunkin, assistant director in charge of our Washington Field Office. “We are committed to bringing Bob home safely to his family. We hope this reward will encourage anyone with information, no matter how insignificant they may think it is, to come forward. It may be the clue that we need to locate Bob.”

“Though he is retired from the FBI, Bob remains a member of the FBI family to this day,” said Director Robert S. Mueller, “and his family is our family. Like all families, we stand together in good times and in times of adversity. Today, we stand together to reaffirm our commitment to Bob Levinson.”

“I am very grateful that the FBI has offered this reward,” said Levinson’s wife Christine. “Our family believes the only way of resolving this issue successfully is with the FBI’s help. It has been an extremely difficult time for my family,” she said. “We all thought Bob would be home by now. But five years have passed, and we still don’t know why he’s being held, who has him, or where he is.”

Levinson will celebrate his 64th birthday on March 10. In addition to his wife of 37 years, Levinson has seven children and two grandchildren. The family has been working tirelessly to bring Levinson home safely. “Our youngest son is about to graduate from high school,” Christine Levinson said. “He was in middle school when his father disappeared.”

In March 2011, the U.S. secretary of state issued a statement that the U.S. government had received indications that Levinson was being held by a group in southwest Asia. That region includes the border areas of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. A publicity campaign is being launched this week in southwest Asia to heighten awareness of Levinson’s abduction, announce the $1,000,000 reward, and solicit information. Billboards, radio messages, and flyers will be used to publicize the reward and the investigation. A telephone tip line will be provided to listeners and viewers in that region so that they can confidentially provide information.

“We’re never going to give up,” Christine Levinson said. “Our goal is to get Bob home. We miss him every single day.”

We need your help. If you have information about the Levinson case, contact your nearest FBI office or American Embassy, or submit a tip to https://tips.fbi.gov.

Supporting the Levinson Family 

The Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI announced this week that it will give the two youngest Levinson children $5,000 each to help with college costs.

“Bob is part of the FBI family,” said Brad Benson, the society’s president. “We are trying to help carry out what he would be doing for his children if he were home. We also want to commend and support the fact that Bob’s family has pulled together so heroically.”