Weaponizing the Sky: Commercial Drones and the Emerging Threat of Domestic Terrorism

Commercial drones have become an increasingly ordinary presence in American life. Once associated primarily with military reconnaissance and precision strikes, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are now routinely used for photography, agriculture, infrastructure inspection, mapping, emergency response, recreation, and public safety. Law enforcement agencies employ drones to document crime scenes, search for missing persons, monitor hazardous incidents, and provide officers with situational awareness without unnecessarily placing personnel at risk. Private companies envision even greater commercial applications as drones become more autonomous, reliable, and capable. Yet the same technological revolution that has placed increasingly sophisticated aircraft in the hands of legitimate users has also placed them within reach of extremists, criminals, and potential terrorists.

The resulting security problem is not simply that a terrorist might attach a weapon to a drone. The larger issue is that commercial UAS can provide individuals and small organizations with capabilities that previously required substantial resources. A drone can observe a location from the air, cross physical barriers, remotely transport objects, interfere with operations, and create psychological disruption while allowing its operator to remain physically separated from the target. As the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice warned Congress in 2025, UAS can be exploited by terrorists and criminals for surveillance, attacks, trafficking, and monitoring law enforcement activities (Hardee & Torphy, 2025). The emerging domestic terrorism threat therefore represents something larger than the weaponization of a particular consumer product. It represents the democratization of a limited form of airpower.

From Military Capability to Consumer Technology

The technological evolution of drones has occurred remarkably quickly. Military UAS once required expensive aircraft, specialized communications systems, trained crews, and substantial logistical support. Commercial drones have dramatically lowered those barriers. Modern consumer aircraft incorporate satellite navigation, stabilized cameras, automated flight controls, sophisticated sensors, and increasingly autonomous functions into relatively inexpensive platforms.

This technological diffusion matters to counterterrorism because terrorist organizations historically seek technologies that compensate for their weaknesses. Terrorists generally cannot confront military or law enforcement organizations conventionally. Instead, they look for inexpensive methods capable of producing consequences disproportionate to their cost. Commercial drones fit that model particularly well because they provide access to the vertical dimension.

The scale of legitimate drone ownership further complicates the problem. Hardee and Torphy (2025) reported to the Senate Judiciary Committee that more than 791,000 UAS were registered with the Federal Aviation Administration as of October 1, 2024, a figure that did not include aircraft that should have been registered but were not. Commercial expansion will likely continue increasing the number of legitimate aircraft in American airspace. Consequently, the presence of a drone cannot automatically be considered suspicious.

This creates an unusual counterterrorism challenge. Security personnel are not simply attempting to detect drones; they must distinguish potentially threatening aircraft from a large population of legitimate recreational, commercial, governmental, and public-safety operations.

Why Drones Appeal to Domestic Terrorists

Commercial drones possess several characteristics that could make them attractive to domestic terrorists. Perhaps the most important is accessibility. An individual does not necessarily need membership in a sophisticated terrorist organization to acquire and operate a commercial UAS. The underlying technology has become part of ordinary consumer culture.

Drones also provide stand-off capability. Traditional physical security is largely designed around controlling people and vehicles. Government buildings, stadiums, power facilities, transportation hubs, and other sensitive locations employ fences, gates, vehicle barriers, checkpoints, magnetometers, guards, and surveillance cameras. These defenses remain important, but most were designed around a two-dimensional security environment in which an attacker approaches a target across the ground.

A small aircraft changes that calculation. The security question can no longer be limited to who or what can pass through the front gate. Security planners must also consider what can approach from above without passing through the gate at all.

Reconnaissance may be one of the most significant terrorist applications of commercial drones. An aircraft equipped with an ordinary camera could potentially be used to observe facilities, crowds, security procedures, emergency responses, or other activities. The UAS would not have to carry a weapon to contribute to an attack. Intelligence gathering is itself an important stage of terrorist planning.

The FBI and DOJ have documented similar concerns outside terrorism cases. According to Hardee and Torphy (2025), drones have been used to conduct illegal surveillance of sensitive government operations, monitor prisoner transports, identify a government witness, and deliver contraband into correctional institutions. These criminal uses demonstrate that offenders already recognize the ability of UAS to overcome conventional physical boundaries.

From Surveillance Platform to Weapon

The most serious concern is the possibility that commercially available aircraft could be modified or exploited to deliver harmful payloads. The FBI and DOJ have warned that UAS could potentially be used in attacks involving explosives and other dangerous materials (Hardee & Torphy, 2025). Federal law already prohibits civilians from equipping unmanned aircraft with dangerous weapons, reflecting congressional recognition that weaponization is not merely theoretical (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2025).

The operational details of converting a commercial drone into a weapon are less important to public policy than the strategic consequence. A remotely operated aircraft potentially separates the attacker from the point of attack while allowing the attacker to challenge traditional security barriers.

Foreign conflicts demonstrate the broader significance of this development. The Congressional Research Service has described the increasing ubiquity, flexibility, affordability, and sophistication of unmanned systems as creating significant defensive challenges. Drones have been employed extensively in recent conflicts, including by state militaries and non-state forces, and the Department of Defense has characterized unmanned systems as an urgent and enduring threat to American personnel and facilities overseas and an increasing concern within the homeland (Gettinger, 2025a).

The United States should not assume that every battlefield technique will transfer successfully into domestic terrorism. The American homeland presents different legal, geographical, technological, and security conditions. Nevertheless, terrorist movements have historically learned from conflicts occurring elsewhere. Techniques demonstrated repeatedly on foreign battlefields can become sources of inspiration for extremists operating far from those conflicts.

Disruption May Be as Important as Destruction

A terrorist drone does not necessarily have to cause casualties to achieve an important objective. Terrorism is fundamentally psychological as well as physical. Terrorist violence seeks to communicate fear to audiences beyond the immediate victims.

This makes disruption an important component of the drone threat. An unidentified aircraft appearing above a major sporting event, political gathering, airport, or other sensitive location can force authorities to make rapid decisions without knowing the operator's intentions. A drone could be harmless, illegally operated, conducting surveillance, or carrying a threat. Security personnel may have only moments to determine which possibility they are confronting.

American experience already demonstrates the disruptive potential of unauthorized UAS. The Government Accountability Office (2022) noted that Newark Liberty International Airport halted landings and diverted aircraft for more than an hour following a potential drone sighting in January 2019. No terrorist weapon was necessary to interfere with the operation of a major transportation facility.

Mass gatherings present a particularly serious concern. Hardee and Torphy (2025) reported that the FBI had conducted 73 UAS detection and mitigation operations protecting major events and mass gatherings. During those operations, the FBI detected 1,210 UAS operating in violation of federal law and located operators in 377 instances. Yet the FBI's protected events represented only a small fraction of the special events that could potentially require counter-UAS protection.

The numbers illustrate a central problem. The federal government possesses specialized capabilities, but the number of potential targets is vastly greater than the number of locations that can receive continuous federal protection.

The Domestic Terrorism Dimension

The drone threat is particularly important when considered alongside the evolution of domestic terrorism. Terrorist violence does not always originate with a hierarchical organization. A lone offender or small extremist cell may possess relatively limited money, training, personnel, and logistical support. Commercial technology can partially compensate for those limitations.

This is where the democratization of technology becomes particularly consequential. An individual who could never obtain military aviation capability can nevertheless obtain a limited aerial surveillance platform. The same individual may use commercially available communications, navigation, artificial intelligence, and other technologies to supplement personal capabilities.

The ideological identity of the offender is secondary to this technological problem. A drone could potentially be exploited by violent extremists motivated by racial hatred, anti-government ideology, political grievances, single-issue causes, foreign terrorist propaganda, or an idiosyncratic mixture of beliefs. Counterterrorism planning should therefore avoid assuming that UAS threats belong to a particular ideology.

The central equation is capability combined with intent.

A significant warning occurred long before today's commercial drone market reached maturity. Hardee and Torphy (2025) noted that one of the earliest federal prosecutions involving an attempted weaponized-drone attack occurred in 2012 and involved a plot targeting the U.S. Capitol. Subsequent plots involving weaponized UAS have also been disrupted by federal authorities. These cases demonstrate that interest in drone-enabled terrorism is not purely speculative.

Critical Infrastructure and Public Gatherings

Critical infrastructure represents another area of concern. CISA's Be Air Aware program specifically addresses physical and cyber risks from UAS and provides guidance for protecting critical infrastructure and public gatherings (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency [CISA], n.d.).

The potential terrorist value of attacking infrastructure is not limited to physical destruction. An attack that temporarily interrupts electricity, transportation, communications, or another essential service could create substantial economic and psychological effects even if physical damage were relatively limited.

This creates an unfavorable economic equation for defenders. The Government Accountability Office (2022) has observed that UAS are increasingly accessible while detection and mitigation technologies can face limitations in effectiveness and may produce unintended consequences. Defenders may therefore have to deploy sophisticated detection networks to address threats originating from comparatively inexpensive aircraft.

Large public events present a different but related problem. Stadiums, festivals, concerts, political events, parades, and other gatherings combine dense populations with symbolic and media value. Even an unidentified drone entering protected airspace can require a security response. The potential presence of a dangerous payload greatly increases the stakes.

The psychological effect must again be considered. An unsuccessful drone attack against a nationally televised event could still generate enormous media attention. Terrorists understand the value of spectacle, and a remotely operated aircraft can itself become part of that spectacle.

Artificial Intelligence and Increasing Autonomy

The next phase of the threat may involve the convergence of commercial drones with artificial intelligence. The concern is not that AI suddenly transforms every consumer drone into an autonomous weapon. Rather, increasingly capable software can gradually reduce the amount of specialized knowledge required to operate complex systems.

Autonomous navigation, computer vision, obstacle avoidance, automated route planning, and object recognition already exist in varying forms across civilian and military applications. Future commercial systems are likely to incorporate increasingly sophisticated autonomy.

This development could complicate defenses that rely primarily on interrupting the communications link between a drone and its operator. Some counter-UAS technologies operate by detecting or interfering with radio-frequency connections. A more autonomous aircraft may not depend upon continuous communication in the same manner.

The Department of Defense's counter-UAS efforts reflect this technological competition. Gettinger (2025b) notes that the department is developing systems capable of locating, identifying, tracking, and intercepting hostile UAS while simultaneously confronting questions involving technical maturity, cost, testing, coordination, and domestic authority.

The future counterterrorism problem may therefore be less about any single technology than about technological convergence: inexpensive aircraft combined with increasingly capable sensors, navigation systems, communications, and artificial intelligence.

Detection Is Not the Same as Identification

Defending against drones begins with knowing that an aircraft is present, but detection alone does not solve the problem.

The FAA (2025) identifies several technologies that can contribute to UAS detection, including radar, radio-frequency systems, electro-optical sensors, and acoustic sensors. These technologies can operate independently or as part of integrated detection networks. However, the FAA emphasizes an essential limitation: detection systems cannot independently determine the intent of an operator or the level of threat presented by an aircraft.

That distinction is critical.

A security officer who detects an unidentified drone must answer several questions. What type of aircraft is it? Who is operating it? Is the flight lawful? Is the aircraft malfunctioning? Is the operator merely careless? Is the drone collecting images? Is it transporting something? Does it present an imminent threat?

Those questions transform a technological detection problem into an intelligence and decision-making problem.

The difficulty increases in cities and around crowded events. Buildings, communications systems, legitimate drone operations, helicopters, commercial aviation, and large numbers of people can complicate both detection and mitigation. A defensive measure that might be acceptable around an isolated military installation could create unacceptable risks near an airport or crowded stadium.

The Capability-Authority Gap

One of the most consequential problems in domestic counter-UAS policy is the gap between those who may first encounter a threatening drone and those legally authorized to employ certain technologies against it.

The federal government tightly restricts counter-UAS mitigation authority. The FAA (2025) states that it does not support the use of counter-UAS mitigation systems by entities other than the federal departments possessing explicit statutory authority. Congress has granted limited counter-UAS authority to the Departments of Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and Energy under particular circumstances (Gettinger, 2025a).

The restrictions exist for legitimate reasons. Interfering with aircraft or radio-frequency communications can create serious safety consequences. A disabled drone can fall onto a crowd. Electronic interference could potentially affect legitimate communications or navigation systems. Detection technologies can raise privacy concerns. Some counter-UAS techniques may also implicate federal laws governing aircraft, communications, surveillance, or computer systems (Government Accountability Office, 2022).

Nevertheless, the restrictions produce a practical problem. A local police officer may be standing beneath a suspicious drone while the nearest federally authorized counter-UAS capability is miles away.

Hardee and Torphy (2025) addressed this issue directly in testimony to Congress, arguing for expanded authority that would permit appropriately trained state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies to employ federally approved detection capabilities and, under more limited circumstances, broader counter-UAS measures.

This capability-authority gap may become one of the most important domestic counterterrorism policy questions surrounding drones. Expanding authority indiscriminately could create substantial public-safety and civil-liberties problems. Keeping authority excessively centralized, however, may leave local officials unable to respond effectively to a rapidly developing threat.

A Layered Defense

There is unlikely to be a single technological solution to the domestic terrorist drone threat. An effective strategy must instead rely upon layers of prevention, detection, identification, protection, response, and investigation.

The first layer is intelligence. The best opportunity to defeat a terrorist drone attack is before the aircraft leaves the ground. Traditional counterterrorism tools remain essential: investigations, threat assessment, suspicious-activity reporting, information sharing, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and cooperation among federal, state, local, tribal, and private-sector organizations.

The second layer is airspace awareness. Security organizations responsible for critical infrastructure and large gatherings need the ability to recognize unusual aerial activity. Depending upon the environment, radar, radio-frequency detection, optical systems, acoustic sensors, Remote ID information, or combinations of technologies may contribute to that awareness.

The third layer is identification and assessment. Detection should trigger a process for determining whether an aircraft represents ordinary activity, a regulatory violation, criminal conduct, reconnaissance, or an imminent attack.

The fourth layer is physical protection. Security assessments should incorporate aerial threats into the design and operation of sensitive facilities. CISA (n.d.) specifically encourages infrastructure owners and operators to recognize UAS threats and consider appropriate mitigation and response options. The traditional security question—how could an attacker enter this facility?—should be supplemented by another: what could reach this facility without physically entering it?

The fifth layer is authorized mitigation. Where permitted by law and justified by risk, specialized counter-UAS systems can provide capabilities ranging from tracking and electronic interference to interception. The Government Accountability Office (2022), however, cautions that mitigation technologies can have unintended consequences and that some systems have limitations against small aircraft. Counter-UAS equipment should therefore not be viewed as a technological shield that eliminates the threat.

The final layer is emergency response. Police, fire departments, emergency medical services, bomb squads, federal agencies, airport authorities, and infrastructure operators need predetermined procedures for suspicious UAS incidents. Decisions concerning evacuation, sheltering, evidence preservation, airspace coordination, and federal notification should not be invented during an unfolding incident.

The Role of Local Law Enforcement

Local law enforcement will play an increasingly important role regardless of whether Congress ultimately expands counter-UAS authority. Patrol officers are geographically distributed throughout American communities and may be among the first officials to observe or receive reports of suspicious drone activity.

Training should therefore extend beyond specialized federal counterterrorism units. Officers should understand basic UAS terminology, recognize suspicious patterns of operation, document relevant observations, preserve recovered aircraft as evidence, understand appropriate notification procedures, and know when suspicious activity may indicate a terrorism nexus.

This does not mean that every unauthorized drone should generate a counterterrorism response. Quite the opposite. As legitimate UAS activity increases, law enforcement must become better at differentiating careless, criminal, and genuinely threatening behavior.

The federal-state-local relationship is particularly important because specialized federal resources cannot protect every potential target. The FBI's experience at mass gatherings demonstrates the scale of the challenge. A small number of federal teams cannot provide continuous protection to every stadium, transportation facility, government building, utility, prison, festival, and public gathering in the country.

The long-term solution must therefore combine specialized federal capabilities with improved awareness, training, detection, information sharing, and response procedures at the local level.

Balancing Security and Liberty

The domestic use of counter-UAS technology raises issues that extend beyond terrorism. Systems capable of detecting, identifying, or tracking drones may collect information connected to legitimate operators. Optical systems may record individuals who have nothing to do with the aircraft. Radio-frequency monitoring can raise communications and privacy concerns. Law enforcement use of UAS itself has generated debate concerning surveillance and civil liberties.

Finklea (2023) notes that federal law enforcement use of drones exists within a broader legal framework protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Those principles should apply equally to the expansion of counter-UAS systems.

A society cannot respond to every emerging technology by constructing an unrestricted surveillance architecture around it. Counterterrorism measures must remain proportionate to the threat and subject to legal oversight.

This is particularly important because drones will increasingly become part of legitimate American commerce. The objective cannot be to remove drones from the national airspace. The objective must be to integrate them while creating mechanisms capable of recognizing and responding to malicious use.

Conclusion

Commercial drones represent an unusual challenge for American counterterrorism because the technology is simultaneously beneficial, widespread, inexpensive, and potentially dangerous. The United States cannot address the threat simply by prohibiting the technology. Drones have become valuable tools for commerce, public safety, emergency response, agriculture, infrastructure management, photography, and recreation. Their legitimate uses will continue expanding.

The security problem lies in the ability of malicious actors to exploit those same capabilities.

For domestic terrorists, commercial drones potentially offer surveillance, stand-off distance, physical access across conventional barriers, disruption, propaganda value, and, in the most serious circumstances, a platform for delivering dangerous payloads. For defenders, the challenge is considerably more complicated. Authorities must detect an aircraft, determine whether it is legitimate, assess its intent, identify its operator, determine whether intervention is legally authorized, and select a response that does not create greater danger than the drone itself.

There is no single counter-drone device capable of solving that problem.

The appropriate response is layered defense built upon intelligence, threat assessment, airspace awareness, detection, identification, physical protection, authorized mitigation, interagency coordination, emergency planning, and improved training for local law enforcement. At the same time, Congress must continue examining whether existing counter-UAS authorities appropriately distribute capabilities among federal, state, and local agencies while protecting aviation safety, privacy, and civil liberties.

The larger significance of the drone threat reaches beyond unmanned aircraft. Commercial UAS illustrate a fundamental change occurring in national security: capabilities that once belonged almost exclusively to governments and sophisticated organizations are migrating into the consumer marketplace. Artificial intelligence, autonomous navigation, advanced sensors, communications technologies, and inexpensive robotics will accelerate that process.

The United States therefore faces a security environment in which an individual terrorist may possess capabilities that would have been unimaginable for a lone offender a generation ago.

For most of modern history, security professionals protected important locations by controlling the ground around them. Gates, guards, barriers, checkpoints, cameras, and patrols created protective rings around potential targets. Those measures remain essential, but they are no longer sufficient.

The next generation of domestic counterterrorism must protect not only the entrances, roads, fences, and crowds surrounding America's potential targets, but the increasingly accessible airspace above them.

References

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (n.d.). Be Air Aware. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. https://www.cisa.gov/topics/physical-security/be-air-aware

Federal Aviation Administration. (2025). UAS detection, mitigation, and response on airports. U.S. Department of Transportation. https://www.faa.gov/airports/new_entrants/uas_detection_mitigation_response

Finklea, K. (2023). Law enforcement and technology: Use of unmanned aircraft systems (CRS Report No. R47660). Congressional Research Service. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47660

Gettinger, D. (2025a). Department of Defense counter unmanned aircraft systems: Background and issues for Congress (CRS Report No. R48477). Congressional Research Service. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48477

Gettinger, D. (2025b). FY2025 NDAA: Countering uncrewed aircraft systems (CRS Report No. IN12418). Congressional Research Service. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12418

Hardee, C., & Torphy, M. (2025, July 22). Statement of Christopher Hardee and Micheal Torphy to the Senate Judiciary Committee: Securing the skies: Law enforcement, drones, and public safety. U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Bureau of Investigation. https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches-and-testimony/statement-of-christopher-hardee-and-micheal-torphy-to-the-senate-judiciary-committee

U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2022). Science & tech spotlight: Counter-drone technologies (GAO-22-105705). https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105705

Dozens of Federal Agencies Initiate Counter-UAS CollaborationDozens of Federal Agencies Initiate Counter-UAS Collaboration

Nov. 26, 2025 | By C. Todd Lopez, Pentagon News |

Over 180 experts from the War Department and other agencies in the federal government met yesterday for a summit to begin a planned three-year effort to deliver counter-small unmanned aircraft system capabilities to warfighters and keep the skies over America safe from dangerous drones.

In August, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth launched the Joint Interagency Task Force 401. Just two weeks ago, senior leaders from the department and partner agencies, including Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll, met at the White House to discuss how to best leverage the new task force and defend the homeland. 

"My priorities for transformation and acquisition reform include improving [counter-small unmanned aircraft systems] mobility and affordability and integrating capabilities into warfighter formations," Hegseth wrote in the August memo, which directed Driscoll to stand up the task force. "[The department] must focus on speed over process by ... establishing JIATF 401 with expanded authorities to execute capability development and delivery timelines that outpace the threat." 

Launching the task force, which Hegseth said will maintain operational capabilities for 36 months, is fully in line with the president's direction to reestablish air sovereignty over the U.S.

"[The department] must enhance its [counter-small UAS] capabilities to protect personnel, equipment and facilities at home and abroad," Hegseth said. 

Representatives from the War Department, Department of Homeland Security, FBI, Transportation Department, Federal Aviation Administration and other agencies — about 50 total — met for the first time at the Mark Center in Alexandria, Virginia, as part of an introductory summit for task force partners.

"This was an opportunity to bring together all of the services, all of our interagency partners that have shared interests and equities with countering small UAS threats, because no one agency can solve this on their own," said Army Brig. Gen. Matt Ross, joint task force commander. "What we're really trying to do is expand the community of interest into a community of action and make sure we're taking tangible steps to defeat the UAS threat we face on a daily basis."

The threat from small UAS is growing, Ross told task force members. 

"Unmanned systems are a defining threat for our time, and I say that because they're prolific, they're evolving quickly, and they're no longer confined to combat," he said. "The [changing landscape] of drones is putting exquisite surveillance and precision strike capability into the hands of individuals and small groups that used to be reserved for our state adversaries." 

Ross emphasized the task force’s three lines of effort to defeat the counter-small UAS threats: defending the homeland, supporting warfighter lethality and joint force training. 

In the short term, according to Ross, homeland defense will focus on the area around Washington; the southern border; and supporting the FIFA World Cup event in June 2026, which is a national special security event.

U.S. Northern Command and Joint Task Force Southern Border personnel have reported some 3,000 drone incursions over the border in the past year and have seen over 60,000 drones just south of the border looking into the U.S., according to Ross. 

Ross affirmed his belief that addressing threats from drones at the border isn't about a hardware solution; it involves communications and data sharing.

"We need a common air picture that includes drones," he said. "In some cases, we need cross-domain solutions that will allow us to see data that's picked up on a secret radar and an unclassed sensor. We need to proliferate active and passive sensors that provide air situational awareness along the southern border." 

That kind of integration is what JIATF 401 is all about, and it's what the task force is expected to bring to bear on the small UAS issue, according to Ross. 

In the National Capital Region, the task force will monitor how sensors from various agencies are able to track threats as they move through the sky, how that information can be passed to decision-makers and how those with the ability to take those threats out of the sky can be given the authority to do so.

"We're not there yet, but we're making progress," Ross said. 

Because the 2026 World Cup is a national special security event, it is a priority. One focus JIATF 401 has during the World Cup is to ensure security personnel have access through the Defense Logistics Agency to purchase counter-UAS capabilities that have been rigorously tested by the War Department. 

Keeping the drone threat at bay and protecting the U.S. homeland — including people and infrastructure — will take a whole-of-government approach, Ross emphasized.

"It's important that this is a joint and interagency effort because nobody can solve this problem alone," Ross said. "[JIATF 401] is a whole-of-government effort to be able to protect our critical infrastructure against the threat of unmanned systems. We've got to partner closely with our local law enforcement and other federal, state, local, tribal and territorial law enforcement to be able to counter this threat, see it before it starts to manifest and then to defeat it before an attack is successful." 

Daniel Tamburello, the undersecretary of science and technology for the Department of Homeland Security, acknowledged that working together across the federal government will be crucial to mission success. 

Both Northcom and DHS are responsible for protecting the homeland, including from drones. 

"There's a lot of overlap in those missions," Tamburello said. "Jointness and interagency cooperation is actually extremely essential with this." 

The threat from drones will only continue to grow. 

"The unmanned aerial system threat is one that has become prolific and widespread, and it's only going to get bigger and more complicated as more people adopt these systems and learn how to use them," Tamburello said. "They've become [accessible], they've become crowd sourced, ubiquitous and available pretty much anywhere. Any bad actor who wants to do something has a chance to do it, and we have to stop them." 

The goals for the task force, Tamburello said, include coordinating with every U.S. agency that deals with the threat posed by counter-UAS to enable interoperability and open communication.

"That is really going to be the best value for the taxpayer to make sure that we're acquiring not only the best systems, but we're not wasting money in the process," he said. 

Micheal Torphy, unit chief of the FBI's UAS and counter-UAS programs within their Critical Incident Response Group, attended the summit. He said the task force's interagency focus will empower the FBI.   

"We're exceptionally excited about this initiative, and we do believe it will enhance our ability to work with our partners to disrupt threats," he said. 

One of the things the FBI is bringing to the table is the National Counter-UAS Training Center, which recently opened in Huntsville, Alabama.  

"Its purpose is to train state, local, tribal and territorial law enforcement officers on counter-UAS, getting them ready for the World Cup, America 250 [celebration] and ultimately the Olympics and other events," he said. 

Torphy also said he thinks the interoperability inside the task force is going to make it easier for the FBI to work hand in hand with other partners to contribute to the mission of keeping the skies over America safe.  

"The way this has been rolled out has been extraordinary," he said. "Gen. Ross and his team have been fantastic in getting us involved very, very early. We're really excited about the future."